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
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
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



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Castro.











A MAP
of Military DISTRICTS and
SUB-DIVISIONS,
for
GREAT BRITAIN.



Printed by R. Phillips 71, St. Paul's Church Yard.

ENGLAND'S ÆGIS;

OR,

The Military Energies

OF

THE EMPIRE.

BY JOHN CARTWRIGHT, ESQ.

*There were in Israel eight hundred thousand valiant
men that drew the sword; and the men of Judah
were five hundred thousand.*

SAMUEL.

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ERRATA.

- Page 19, line 3 from bottom *read* of national
50, line 7 from top *read* artillery-horses
76, line 4 from bottom *read* the horses shall
76, line 1 from bottom *read* freemen
79, line 7 from top *read* principal part
96, line 14 from top *read* security
111, line 6 from top *read* her empire o'er
126, line 4 from top *read* nuisance
136, line 8 from top *read* On rights (&c. also)
discourse
138 line 19 from top *read* 1757

DEDICATION

TO

A RETIRED STATESMAN.

Sir,

TO whom, in the present conflict for empire and existence, ought to be dedicated THE ENERGIES OF ENGLAND, but to him who, of all her sons, possesses a mind the most energetic? To whom shall be dedicated a proud effort to restore to full vigour and energy THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, but to him who has

the most comprehensive knowledge, and holds the purest principles, of that Constitution.

Although a Dedicator, I am no flatterer. I have occasionally differed, and I may again differ, from you in opinion on particular points. But if, when I were to be led to battle, I could have the choice of my General, it would not be him I should choose with whom I had never disagreed; but him in whom I found combined the greatest talents, with the truest devotion to the cause in which I was to contend.

When we are now to fight, not only for our fields and fire-sides, but for those laws and liberties which make an Englishman's field an Eden, and his fire-

side an earthly heaven, we cannot but turn our thoughts to one in whom, by a singular felicity, are united the most popular accomplishments for inspiring union, confidence, affectionate attachment, and public enthusiasm; and, at the same time, a grasp of intellect for counter-acting the gigantic schemes of the despot of France; and a robustness of mind, for wielding the vengeance of Britain.

Had, Sir, your ruling star gratified your early ambition with long possession of the reins of Government, perhaps no work of real patriotism might ever have been dedicated to you. When a Government has received a deep taint of impurity, 'tis an infected habitation from which those who, in the full fire of their passions,

have ever made it their abode, do not without a miracle escape in moral health. What Statesman, in our time, has tarried in that habitation, and escaped without infection? Which of them can make the honest boast that HE RESTORED PURITY TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND ENERGY TO THE CONSTITUTION?

Alas!--But, no: I will suppress the agitating emotions arising within me: From the hateful spectacle of freedom betrayed, a constitution trampled on, and the wicked audacity of unbridled power, I will turn to that school of political adversity, in which I trust you have acquired a mastery over your passions, fortified your integrity, matured your judgment, and plumed your genius for bear-

ing you aloft in the region of a luminous and generous policy which, at the same time that it maintains the prerogative and raises the glory of a Sovereign, consults the rights, the interests, and the feelings of a free people.

Assist, Sir, in buckling the death-striking ÆGIS on the dread arm of BRITANNIA; that, so graced, and with her other attributes adorned, she may appear another Goddess of Wisdom; who, as poets sing, invented the distaff, the loom, and the ship; who patronized industry, and more especially the workers in wool; who bestowed on mankind the peaceful olive; but who was never otherwise attired than as she sprang, spear in hand, from the brain of Jove, IN COMPLETE ARMOUR.

THE AUTHOR.

EPISTOLARY ADDRESS

TO THE VOLUNTEERS.

Generous Countrymen!

AFTER so many states and kingdoms; vainly relying on what are called regular armies, numerous and well-disciplined, have successively passed beneath the Gallic yoke, or purchased precarious peace with dishonour, it was reserved for ENGLAND, standing alone, to teach mankind the true science of national defence; and for her gallant sons it was also reserved to render their country a spectacle, to the prostrate nations, of profound admiration, and her Government a subject of their contemplation equally august and affecting. May England become an example to those nations, worthy of her own former fame, and of their imitation!

It is not by the alliance of potentate with potentate, it is not by combining together discordant hosts of arbitrary Governments, great and small, that our neighbours of Germany can obtain either safety or independence. Would Germany forbid the fell demon of the South to disturb her repose, or the mighty Magog of the frozen North to intermeddle in her concerns? let her Princes make allies of their people; let modern Germans, like their ancient sires, like the English also, and the English Americans, scions of the same stock, live under legitimate laws of common assent, made by delegates freely chosen; and throughout her numerous states, from the Rhine to the Boristhenes, from the Danube to the Dwina, let there be to her earthly thrones no other defence than the freeman's sword; nor to the heavenly throne be raised, in adoration, any other than a freeman's voice; and then, but not till then, shall Germany be capable of assured defence.

Let groves of nodding pikes, and moving spears of free and spontaneous growth, contribute, with

the waving rush and quivering reed, to adorn the banks of her frontier rivers; and then, although a thousand bridges shall bestride each stream, it shall still be a barrier as impassable to hostile Gaul or Muscovite as fields of air to the wingless quadruped.

Without freedom, as, to their grief, the Batavians can tell you, MILITARY DEFENCE is only the evidence of complete subjugation; and the more triumphant the success the more hopeless the condition of the defended.

But would we understand how freedom and defence are so go hand in hand, and how civil liberty is even to gain strength with the increase of military power, then that CONSTITUTION, which is the table of our duties, the record of our rights, and the depository of our liberties, must be the object of our study, and the guide of our steps.

To the sacred book of the CONSTITUTION, first composed in the Saxon tongue and the Saxon stile, belongs an inestimable leaf on the subject of military defence and common security, which

unfaithful trustees, substituting in its place an interpolation of unsound doctrine, big with ruin, disease, and death, have long withheld from the English eye, although its contents ought to be imprinted on every English heart.

To restore to the sacred book this leaf in its genuine purity, and thereby to illustrate those duties, to vindicate those rights, and to preserve those liberties which are the ends and objects of the CONSTITUTION, is the design of these pages.

Protect then, O, Protectors of your country, this work ! It is the work of one who, equally with yourselves, wishes that country to be happy and illustrious ; of persecuted mankind, the refuge ; of enslaved mankind, the example ; of civilized mankind, the glory.

J. C.

PREFACE.

THE Reader ought to be informed that, exclusive of other passages in the following work, a portion of the second part is properly a new edition of a part of *An Appeal, civil and military, on the subject of the English Constitution*, written five years ago, and long since out of print.

On that, as on the present occasion, the writer has endeavoured to shew that the systems of defence, respectively proper to a despotic and to a free state, are essentially different; and likewise to prove that, in the very texture of the ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, there will be found, by those who shall seek it, a defensive *military* system for

our country, as a free state, which, for excellence, has no parallel in the counsels of man.

If a free state, having long neglected her defensive institutions, shall fall into the error of defending herself, in an arduous struggle for preservation, on the principles which belong to states that are despotic, her government, whatever be the event of the contest with a rival nation, will inevitably become despotic; or, in other words, that state will perish, and the people sink into perfect servitude.

Why, at this juncture, do the friends of their country endeavour to animate every bosom, and to nerve with vigour every man, to resist the designs of *France*; but that its dominion would be a government of despotism, and subjection to such authority complete slavery? But, had we at this moment no better system of defence

than that which is common to all despotie states, the *enemy* need not bring hither his sword to destroy our constitution, and deprive us of our freedom.

At our very door, we have seen the contrast between the opposite systems of defence. When *Holland* was defended, on a right system, against the Duke of *Alva*, and the arms of *Spain*, the result was *liberty* and *glory*; when recently defended, on a wrong system, against the arms of *England*, the result was *slavery* and *degradation*. The very success of that defence rivetted her chains.

When free institutions have fallen into decay and oblivion, there are but few by whom they are understood or regarded; and if the habits of the people are become in any degree unfavourable to their revival, there are not many statesmen who will have sufficient force of mind, or energy

of virtue, to set up, for reformers of the people's habits, and the restorers of decayed institutions, however excellent in themselves, or how necessary soever they may be to the salvation of the state.

No common praise may, therefore, be due to his Majesty's present Ministers, for the degree in which they have already called the attention of the people to the long-neglected but the true system of *English* defence; and if men deeply versed in the Constitution, and particularly in the *military* branch of it, shall yet discern great deficiencies, possibly they ought to give Ministers credit for proceeding gradually to revive that system, and gradually to inspire the people with a wish for its complete restoration; rather than to censure them for not having gone, in the first instance, more directly, and more roundly to work.

The experiment, however, which they have made on the patriotism and martial spirit of the people, having answered to the full extent of any hopes they could have formed, they have now encouragement to proceed towards the completion of the noble design; for it would henceforth be a libel on the nation to doubt its preferring a system of defence which perfectly accords with the CONSTITUTION, and indeed makes a vital part of it, to any other.

No other, indeed, as I trust these pages will make manifest, can in any respect compare with it. It absolutely excludes the possibility of our country being *made the seat of war*; and, in that particular alone, it is of incalculable value: its purchase is above all price; its merit beyond all competition.

It is apprehended that, from a mere delineation in the second part of this work, of the practical operation of the system, and how it would prove a security against that dreadful evil, the truth is established beyond a possibility of doubt; and that, in any rational mind, it must follow that the instant we shall be placed in a *constitutional* attitude of defence, in the same instant *Bonaparte* must abandon every thought of invasion. If this be so, as I most assuredly believe it to be, then it should seem that, so long as the enemy shall continue his invasive preparations, so long there will be unquestionable evidence that our system of defence is materially short of constitutional perfection; and Ministers cannot, in my judgment, have a much better test of the soundness of their own measures; neither can they, as I pre-

sume to think, receive better advice, than not to lose a single day in providing against the risk here alluded to.

On this reasoning, we must perceive that, as *Benaparte* could not, in *March* last, speculate on the vulnerability of our Empire any where but at *home*, had he then seen us in such a constitutional attitude, we should have had NO WAR; for, daring as he may be, in risking hazardous enterprises, he has too much penetration to attempt impossibilities. When, therefore, we shall know how many millions per month the war is costing us, we shall exactly know how many millions per month an adherence to the military branch of our Constitution would, on this occasion, have saved us. And the inquiry will farther lead us into the discovery, that our CONSTITUTION is no less our best shield against invasion,

and the best bulwark of our *liberty*, than it is the best protection of our *purses* and *property*. Every successive accumulation of the national debt was the offspring of WAR. Of all human means for the prevention of war, a *cheap* preparedness for it, accompanied by a high martial spirit, is the best. But, obvious as it is, that PEACE is the remedy against the evils of debt and taxation; yet, for want of employing the right means of averting war, not even Ministers, the most pacifically inclined, have been able to keep war from our gates.

From Sir *Robert Walpole* down to Mr. *Addington*, instead of experiencing a *constitutional prevention* of the cause of national debt, that is, ARMED PREPARATION ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, the nation has been uniformly fed with the

hope of an alleviation of its burthens; by the efficacy of a *sinking fund*; but notwithstanding the clearness of the calculations upon *principal and interest*, for proving the practicability of paying off, or keeping down, the debt, the nation has, as uniformly, found the hope delusive; and that it has been sinking deeper and deeper in the gulph of pecuniary distress; and such, if she will not restore her constitution, must continue to be the case until she be overwhelmed.

Nor would such restoration only preserve us from attack at home, but be the most powerful prevention of war in general; for, perfectly secure in our own island, the whole of our regular land force, and almost the whole of our navy, would be applicable to foreign services; affording such an ample security to our foreign pos-

sessions as, to all human appearance, should discourage any rival power from attempting to molest them. It is thus, by a constitutional and virtuous government, rendering every individual particle of our physical strength available for our defence, both at home and abroad, that we might indeed put ourselves in a situation to benefit by a *sinking fund*, with a rational prospect, under Ministers moderately wise, provided they were honest, of continuing in honourable peace until we should have experienced the extinction of our debt ; whereas, a contrary conduct may speedily lead to the extinction of our state, and to a condition as abject as that of the *modern Romans*.

But, indeed, without looking any farther for a motive to a revival of the permanent military energies of our Constitution, than to gigantic *France*, a country of thrice our

population, under a military despotism, incurably hostile, and sure to strike at our existence, if ever for a moment off our guard ; no Englishman, pretending to fidelity to his country, can knowingly propose to us any system of military security short of **THE BEST**, especially when that best system is **A VITAL PART OF THE CONSTITUTION.**

Much has been said on *offensive* operations being the best *defensive* system ; and there is, indeed, mixed with the danger of the experiment, so much military wisdom in the *principle*, that we ought to be guarded against the misapplication of it in practice. The two principal arguments in favour of invading the enemy, who threatens you with invasion, are these : first, that you are thereby to make a diversion of his forces, and find him ample employment at home ; and secondly, that it is in the nature of

attack to raise the spirits of your own troops and nation, and has a tendency to depress those of the enemy. But, when you set about invading the invader, you ought to be certain that he is somewhere vulnerable in a degree to give scope to your operations; and you ought to be able to act upon such a scale as to oblige him to employ a very material part of his force in opposing you, or hazard some considerable part of his dominions. And there are other very material considerations to be attended to.

With regard to the effects to be respectively produced on the spirits of the opposite parties, by elevating those of *England* and depressing those of *France*, if those very effects can be *better* produced by a *defensive* system, carrying *infallibility* on its forehead, then, in that particular

case, it is, for many very powerful reasons, to be preferred. You cannot make a better diversion of the enemy's force than by effectually deterring it from attempting to execute its purpose. And how can you more effectually elevate the spirits of your people, than by placing them in a condition to laugh at the impotence of their enemy?

Restore but the military energies of the **ENGLISH CONSTITUTION**, and then, from that instant, without any figure of speech, you make successful invasion an impossibility; and the enemy, unable to annoy you either abroad or at home, will probably be brought to reasonable terms of peace; for he will scarcely continue a commercial war, when a military war can no longer avail him. But should he still persevere, then will be your time, if you find him vulnerable, to become

yourselves the invaders. Having laid the solid foundations of your own security, your whole regular force might be employed to strike some stroke that should shake the consular throne, or at least, dismember the Gallic dominion, now held together by the bonds of a hateful despotism.

But the offensive system, prematurely adopted, or without great ability, might be full of hazard. Although you should find a vulnerable point, it might not be an adviseable experiment. If you could not strike deep, your enemy might not even parry the blow; but at the same instant pour his troops upon your shores. If, before you hazarded the attempt, you should not have fully restored the military energies of your Constitution your offensive force must be comparatively

small, and, experiencing a counter-attack, you might be obliged to recal your troops, and possibly under circumstances of disadvantage. In short, whether you meditate attack or defence, it will be found that you have a neglected system, which it is the first duty of every Englishman, from the throne to the cottage, to restore; not only because, in a *military* view, it is the best system that has yet been the fruit of human invention, but because it is **A VITAL PART OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.**

Besides this idea of *offensive operations being the best defensive system*, there is another system which is directly its opposite, and yet is in high military and political estimation—I mean the *Fabian* system. Hence we see the necessity of looking with caution upon *systems*, and learning

to think for ourselves. In consulting history, and the military science, we must learn to distinguish the *circumstances* under which every particular system is to be preferred to another. The two systems I have here noticed are *extremes*; and it would be easy to shew that, when injudiciously adopted, the danger of either of them may also be *extreme*. He, whose counsels should reduce *England* to act upon the *Fabian* system for more than THREE DAYS might be the author of incalculable evil.

ENGLAND'S ÆGIS;
OR
THE MILITARY ENERGIES
OF THE
ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

INTRODUCTION.

THE present situation of our country has abundantly called forth the voluntary services, not only of those who wield the sword, but, of those also who hold the pen. In neither of those capacities is it the first time the author has been upon duty. For thirty years of his life he bore the sword in the public service; and for as many, has he been in the frequent habit of holding the volunteer pen.

Seeing that so far as he has had the means of observing, in the service he now wishes to perform, he has not been anticipated by any other writer, and

conceiving that service to be of the highest importance, he strongly feels the obligation of submitting to his country, and particularly to its brave defenders, his well-considered sentiments.

It is his object to shew what are the true *principles of defence*, by which our COUNTRY, in the comprehensive and majestic sense of that word, is to be preserved. It would, of course, be a very negligent performance of this task, were he not to examine the present *temporary* measures of defence adopted by ministers, and detailed in the statutes which, at their recommendation, and with abundance of confidence in those statesmen, have been passed: and equally would he be to blame, were he not also to pay due attention to that part of the system which they, in common with all modern ministers, consider as their *permanent* reliance, namely, the standing army: or, should he omit to place in comparison with this mixed system of temporary and permanent establishments, that which he conceives to be the true system of our country. To this end, he must retouch the outline of that plan of defence which, five years ago, he drew up and soon afterwards published, in his '*Appeal, Civil and*

*Military, on the Subject of the English Constitution.**

In this plan he pretends not to any originality ; but merely to report the wisdom of one mightier than himself, in whose steps he treads, and the latchet of whose shoes he merely hopes he is not unworthy to unloose. It is the excellence of this plan that it combines in perfect harmony the rights, the duties, and the liberties of Englishmen ; and that, having the simplicity of nature, it has likewise its force ; and now, that we are called upon by the presiding minister, to draw the sword in defence of our "*property, our rights, and independence,**" it ought to be no slight recommendation of this plan to him,

* See the speech of Mr. *Addington* on the 20th June 1803.

" I have no doubt whatever that, should circumstances render it necessary, the great body of the population of the country would, upon an appeal from their sovereign, stand forward in defence of their *rights and independence*," Perhaps it is happy for the future interests of this empire that the occasion now offers, of which we should decisively avail ourselves, to shew that any projects of attack upon our finances, (*property*) and independence, such as the French government seems to entertain, must be vain and futile."

that it constitutes an essential, a vital part of the **ENGLISH CONSTITUTION**; which is not a mere civil government, in the ordinary acceptation of the word *civil*, but a two-fold and admirable system of *civil and military* polity, most happily combined; whereby these two characters, like the faculties of intellectual ability and bodily force in man, are inseparably interwoven, and constitute a complete state or *free government*.

In the ordinary concerns of life, success is not expected to follow, if we despise common prudence, or reject knowledge. In art and in science false principles are sure to produce disappointment and discredit; and if, in their contests with *France*, we have seen mighty and confederated nations fall in succession before her, how infinitely important to us is it that, when *England*, single-handed, has to maintain the struggle, she should conduct her defence on *right principles*! He that should deviate through error would be entitled to our compassion; but he who should set right principles at nought, by intentional violation, would incur the deepest blame.

On the mere volunteer adviser of his country

lies a weighty responsibility, not to trifle with *principles*; how incumbent, then, is it on those, who, by office or station, are responsible for the plans on which that country is really called upon to act ! It is, therefore, to be hoped that, at a crisis on which hangs every thing valuable to society, even the existence of the state itself, and thereby perhaps the welfare of a large portion of mankind, that there are none in public trust and responsibility who could be capable of rejecting, or evading, that which they knew to be imperatively required at their hands by the constitution of their country.

On the subject of *defence*, it is a leading intention of this work to set before ministers *that* constitution; trusting in their candour not to shut their eyes against truth; and relying on their integrity that their own system, wherever it shall appear to be necessary, shall receive early amendment.

Perhaps it will appear that that part of their system, which they make only temporary and occasional, ought to be permanent; and that which they consider as permanent ought only to be temporary and occasional: but let us enter upon the comparison

with impartial and dispassionate minds ; for that is the only way for arriving at a satisfactory conclusion.

In the preamble to the first of the statutes touching a general arming, (43 Geo. III. c. 55.) we find it properly laid down, that his Majesty has vested in him, *by law*, the necessary powers for repelling invasion ; but, in the second statute (c. 96) it is *improperly* said that he has the *prerogative* * of requiring, on such occasions, "*the military services of all his liege subjects.*" Prerogative being defined to be "a discretionary power of acting for the public good, where the positive laws are silent†," it should seem that the application of the word *prerogative* in this latter statute, to express the executive *power*, is by no means correct ; because, in respect of the king's *power* to command, on all proper occasions, the military services of all his people, the positive laws are by no means silent ; but the contrary.

What in our law books, speaking locally, is called the *posse comitatus*, or *power* of the *county*, is, when wanted, the king's *power* ; and this power in

* Locke on Gov. 2. §. 166. † Black's Com. I. 251.

the *Saxon* times, being properly organized and officered, was the sole *militia* of the land, and infinitely the best it ever experienced. Notwithstanding militias of different descriptions were afterwards, in the reigns of *William* the *Norman*, *Charles* the Second, and *George* the Second, unhappily introduced, yet that original militia, the *posse comitatus*, disgracefully as it has been neglected*, has, in proof of an intrinsic excellence, to this hour maintained its legal existence, and, as it is expressed by Sir *William Jones*, it includes the whole *civil* state, from the duke to the peasant.†”

As *law*, nothing indeed is better known than that every able-bodied man belongs to this power, and that every such man is bound to obey the king's proper representative, not only in repelling invasion, but in putting down rebellion or insurrection, or even in suppressing an ordinary tumult; and that the *number* of the *posse*‡ to be called forth on any such occasion, rests in the discretion of the sheriff or

* Enquiry into the legal Mode of suppressing Riots, with a Constitutional Plan of future Defence. p. 10.

† *Ib.* 14.

‡ *Ib.* 23.

other magistrate, or in that of the king's generals. Here there is no *prerogative* in the case ; but a well ascertained *legal power*, which is a much better thing.

Now, such being the duties of a *posse comitatus*, it is necessarily their duty to be armed equal to such services : as it is incumbent on the legislature also, and the executive government, to look well to the performance of that duty, and to enforce it whenever, through indolence, it is neglected. Whenever, as it is well known, there is such a failure in the duty of common defence, that any one's house, or other premises, is pillaged or destroyed, such failure in the eye of the law is a *crime*, and the whole neighbourhood is *punished*, by the levying on them a fine to the full extent of the damage. This principle indeed is so deeply ingrafted into our law, that the county in which a traveller is robbed on the highway, between sun and sun, must make him amends for not having either prevented the robbery, or, by its *hue and cry*, recovered his property. Here, then, we see the *reason*, on which rests the duty of common defence : As every one is to have the *benefit*, so every one is to bear the *burthen*.

But the *hue and cry* is for the *instant* pursuit of robbers, felons, murderers, and other desperate persons* ; and the “*cry made for weapons to keep the peace*,” is to suppress riots and rebellions, and to resist enemies †, or to oppose “the *sudden* coming of strange enemies into the realm‡ ;” when there is no time to send arms some hundreds of miles ; much less for the preparative of “*training and exercise*.” The conclusion is obvious. With such a CONSTITUTION—for it is not by mere *law*, but by inherent right, and from inherent duty, that, as free men, we are ever to be armed,—with such a CONSTITUTION, I say, what must we think of our country, after a ten years war, at the cost of three hundred millions, in which, as we were told, we were fighting for social order, for religion, and for THAT CONSTITUTION itself, being, at the revival of the war in March last, as utterly unprepared for repelling invasion as was *Belgium* or *Hanover*, when their people respectively were too late called upon to rise

* 13 Ed. 2. c. 4.

† Jones's Inquiry, 27. Poph. 121, 122.

‡ Disc. on Estab. National Const. Force, by Lord Liverpool.

en masse. There has long been somewhere a *mass* of blame, of great magnitude, touching the matter now under consideration; and it were devoutly to be wished we could see a sincere disposition, in the administration of executive government, to benefit their country by a substantial amendment.

On the part both of the legislature and the executive government, in early times, it was the sound and *honest* policy to preserve alive the energies of the *posse comitatus*, or *Saxon* militia, and wholesome statutes from time to time were enacted for that purpose; besides which the books abound with reports, in which the duties of its members are clearly laid down*; which statutes and reports, and the whole of the law, except only its *finis and punishments*, it has been the misfortune of later times to see “disgracefully neglected,” as more than twenty years ago was feelingly lamented by Sir *William Jones*, but alas! to little purpose.

The arming in ancient times was properly regulated by the pecuniary ability of the party; as we

* See this part of the law brought into a focus by Sir *W. Jones* in his enquiry.

see by the 13th of *Edward* the First, (called the *English Justinian*) § 2. c. 6. which commands,
 “ That every man *have in his house* harness for to
 “ keep the peace after the *ancient* assize: that is to
 “ say, every man between 15 years of age and 60
 “ years shall be assessed, and *sworn* to armour ac-
 “ cording to the quantity of their lands and goods;
 “ that is to wit, from 15 pounds lands, and goods
 “ 40 marks, an hauberk, a breast-plate of iron, a
 “ sword, a knife, and a horse; and from 10 pounds
 “ of lands, and 20 marks goods, an hauberk, a
 “ breast-plate of iron, a sword, and a knife; and
 “ from 5 pounds lands, a doublet, a breast-plate of
 “ iron, a sword, and a knife; and from 2 pounds
 “ land, and more, unto 5 pounds of land, a sword, a
 “ bow and arrows, and a knife; and he that hath less
 “ than 40 shillings yearly, shall be sworn to keep gis-
 “ arms, knives, and other less weapons; and he that
 “ hath less than 23 marks in goods shall have swords,
 “ knives, and other less weapons; and all other that
 “ may shall have bows and arrows *out* of the fo-
 “ rest, and *in* the forest bows and bolts. And that
 “ *view of armour* be made every year two times.
 “ And in every hundred and franchise, two consta-

"bles shall be chosen to make the view of armour.
 "And the constables aforesaid *shall present*, before
 "justices assigned, such *defaults* as they shall see
 "in the country about armour, &c. And the *jus-*
 "*tices* assigned *shall present* at every parliament,
 "unto the king, such defaults as they shall find,
 "and the *king shall provide remedy therein.*"

Such indeed was the provident care to keep the
 people armed, and in readiness for the performance
 of their duties, that by 33 Hen. VIII. c. 9. every
 able man was to have "a bow and arrows ready
 "continually *in his house*; every servant of 17
 "years of age was to have a bow and four arrows
 "continually for himself, at his proper costs
 "and charges;" and for every "man-child being
 "of the age of *seven* years and above," the parent
 was to keep "a bow and two shafts;" and all were
 to be regularly "trained and exercised" to the use
 of these arms, whether in war or in peace, under
 severe penalties. Now if it be not more the *duty* of
 the taxed householder than of those of lower condi-
 tion to keep arms, and to learn the use of them, it
 certainly is more his *interest*; for, in whose keep-
 ing can the property of a nation be so securely plac-

ed as in that of its owners? And on whom falls the disgrace and the punishment, when rioters commit spoil and mischief, but on those who are assessed to the taxes? Nor, indeed, is the law and obligation of arms-bearing merely just and equitable; for, if we value either our honour or our freedom, it is indispensably necessary, since it is that condition precisely which distinguishes free men from slaves. A modern writer has well observed that, “where the government only is armed, there despotism is established *;” and certainly nothing can be more self-evident. The words of *Aristotle*, much older than christianity, are likewise striking: “Those” says he, “who command the arms in a country are masters of the state, and have it in their power to make what revolutions they please †.” Hence, so long as the government of this country keeps up a large standing army, if *many times the number of that army* shall not in the *civil state* be in the habit of arms-bearing, the liberties of the country must as inevitably perish, as the liberties of every other

* Young's Travels, 550.

† Polit. vii. 9.

country, in which the government only was armed, have perished.

Sir *William Jones*, considering how arms-bearing, in consequence of court-policy on one hand, and the indolence of the people on the other hand, had fallen into disuse, is careful to remove, for the benefit of cautious persons, every doubt on that important duty. He first quotes the weightiest legal authorities, and then draws these, amongst other conclusions: "That since the musquet and bayonet
" are found by experience to be the most effectual
" arms, all persons, who constitute the power of a
" county, are bound to be completely skilled in the
" use of them.

"That since the only safe and certain mode of
" using them with effect is by acting in a body, it is
" the duty of the whole civil state to know the pla-
" toon exercise, and to learn it in companies*."

Aware, however, at the time of his writing, of the profound ignorance of some, and of the extravagant prejudices of others, he recommends that such

* *Jones's Inquiry*, 19.

companies as shall have “voluntarily associated for
 “the sole purpose of joining the power, when legally
 “summoned, and, with that view, have learned
 “the proper use of their weapons, street-firing, and
 “the various evolutions necessary in action,” should
 “be taught, in the most private and orderly manner,
 “for two or three hours early every morning,
 “until competently skilled, and not unnecessarily
 “march through streets or high roads, nor make
 “any the least *military* parade, but consider themselves
 “entirely as of the *civil* state *.”

It is lamentable to think of our country having been so circumstanced, that a man of profound wisdom and exalted virtue, while expounding the law, should feel the necessity of recommending such circumspection in obeying it that, in so doing, his countrymen should not incur the displeasure of their rulers!—of those rulers who were in the perpetual neglect and violation of *their* duty, in not enforcing universal obedience to the law.

In the year 1782, I had the honour to consult Sir

* Jones's Inquiry, 37.

William on the correctness of a "*Declaration of Rights, without which no Englishman can be a Free man, nor the English Nation a Free People*;" as well as upon the propriety of the subjoined notes. To find such a man speak with satisfaction on "the similarity of our political sentiments," and call the declaration "an excellent paper, which ought to be written on the heart of every Englishman," I need not say was highly gratifying; neither need I state with how much complacency one, who had the approbation and friendship of a Sir *William Jones*, could smile at illiberality he has since experienced on account of those "political sentiments." The postscript to that letter, dated May 23, 1802, is in these words: "It is my deliberate (though private) opinion, that the people of England will never be a people, in the majestic sense of the word, unless two hundred thousand of the civil state be ready, before the first of next November, to take the field without rashness or disorder, at twenty-four hours notice."

We have seen that the late statutes already referred to, in declaring the general obligation to military service, for preserving the peace, putting down

rebellion, or resisting invasion, have spoken only the language of the constitution and common law, and, if ministers, for reasons best known to themselves, have thought fit, while the danger of *invasion* still hangs over us, and while the courts in one part of the united kingdom have been occupied in trying and condemning many persons for *rebellion*, to suspend the operation of those statutes, as to the training and exercise of a large majority of the *posse comitatus*, that is a matter, not for me, but, for them to explain. It is not, however, very consistent with the doctrine laid down in those statutes of universal obligation, to come at the king's call to suppress *armed* rebels, or to encounter *the veteran legions of French invaders*, that ministers should do any thing to discourage a great majority of the people *from qualifying themselves to perform those duties*. This is somewhat different from requiring all men to be "*sworn to armour* two times in every year *; and from levying penalties on them, if not provided with arms and with butts to shoot at; or for neglecting but for a few weeks to "*use themselves in shooting* †."

* See p. 4.

† Hen. VIII. c. 9.

When we contemplate the nature and principles of our government ; when we see the extremely perilous situation of *Ireland*, and the necessity to be at liberty, if the war be carried into that country, to send thither every disposeable soldier in *Great Britain* ; when we consider the hostility and the power of *France* ; when we reflect on *the state of our finances*, and on the pressure of taxes for supporting the enormous expence of our military establishment in a standing army, under the two denominations of regulars and of militia ; and when we take into our recollection that the *posse comitatus* is an actual militia, *an essential part of our constitution*, the cheapest of all means of defence, and at the same time infinitely the most powerful ; when, I say, we allow due weight to all these considerations, I confess that I should have thought much better than I do of the statutes in question, had it been the object of them to have revived the genuine *posse comitatus*, instead of introducing various novelties of a very different character.

As in voyaging across a dangerous sea in a tempestuous season, the preservation or the loss of the ship must very greatly depend upon the keeping of a true

or a false reckoning, so, in a vindictive conflict between two rival empires for the mastery, the preservation or the loss of the state which is attacked, will probably, in a very high degree, depend on the defence being conducted on true or on false principles. Hence the importance of knowing what *are* our true principles of defence, and where to find them.

Happily in our own case they are easily pointed out; and it is still more happy for us that, making vital parts of that CONSTITUTION for which we are to fight, an *English People* will be disposed to adopt them with fervour, and to act upon them with enthusiasm; for a CONSTITUTION, whose *military* excellencies are fully equal to its *civil* perfections, must, especially at such a trying crisis as the present, be doubly endeared to the hearts of those who are to live under it.

It must be almost superfluous to observe that those, who administer *such* a CONSTITUTION, have in their hands the *two* fountains,—national UNANIMITY, and national ENTHUSIASM. May their fidelity and their wisdom set free those fountains, and present, in the presence of admiring earth and approving heaven, the sublime spectacle of a great

nation drawing the sword in defence of its rights, determined to live free or to die fighting !

Let ministers, however, be jealous of officious partizans, who may attempt to promote a spurious unanimity on false foundations ; for all such attempts, being against *Defence on Right Principles*, may but too probably, in the hour of trial, be found to have produced effects the most pernicious.

As, in time of peace, a total absence of the military, in support of the civil powers of the Constitution, would soon bring it to a dissolution, so, in time of war, if we ignorantly attempt to supersede its civil energies, under a false idea of increasing its military strength, we shall soon make havoc of the whole.

For the honour of his country, the author hopes he shall never see an *English* general lead an *English* soldier to battle, deprived of his reason—of his *intellectual ability*—by the use of *Turkish* opium, or *French* brandy, in order to inflame his courage, and cause a momentary augmentation of *bodily force* : and he equally hopes never to see the *English* government put the *English* nation in *military* array under any species of intoxication, that

should cause it for one moment to forget its *civil rights* and its *civil duties*. No ; give the slave opium, and the soldier of despotism brandy, to intoxicate him for the battle with the fury of a beast ! The free man's courage is highest when his reason is most clear, when he knows the inestimable value of that for which he fights, and when he enters the conflict conscious of being, in the full sense of the word, a man. Seeing liberty in victory, and slavery in defeat, the battle has no terrors ; for nothing he dreads but degradation and shame. Such men may be slain, but cannot be conquered. And, as a stimulus to glorious actions, to endurance of privation, to perseverance under all difficulties, how infinitely the god-like enthusiasm of such men surpasses the drunken fury of brutalized wretches, who fight in chains for the choice of masters ; or the infatuation of those, who, by having surrendered their liberty to an unprincipled usurper, have become the mechanical instruments of his ambition !

The author trusts that these views of his subject will fully justify the course he has taken, in unfolding the principles of defence on which we ought now to act. It is not mere WAR in which we are en-

gaged: it is a conflict with a rival, and a despotic state, for our **POLITICAL EXISTENCE**. We are not, therefore, to resort for advice, exclusively to the camp; nor to study our defence under those only to whom war is a trade, and soldiership a profession: we must not place our sole reliance on martial tactics and discipline, on trenches and manœuvres, on plans of field operation and displays of generalship. These are but of *secondary* consideration; and when we contemplate the nature of our state as above delineated, we shall find that, for the purposes of *defence*, we attach, to what is *scientific* in the art of war, far more importance than it merits; and we shall even discover that some of the most celebrated maxims in that science are mere falacies, calculated to mislead us into dangerous and disgraceful error.

It is not meant to depreciate the military character, which has shone so illustriously on many a well fought field; but merely to shew that, *for national defence on English land*, we depend not in the smallest degree upon any other species of military force than that which is inseparably interwoven with civil freedom in the very texture of our **CONSTITUTION**; which, by making every citizen a soldier, has placed

our security infinitely above the trumpery of the modern parade, and even above all that is called *science* in modern war. Would Englishmen, therefore, understand the true principles of national defence, let them resort, not only to the camp, but to the **CONSTITUTION !**



THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ENERGIES
FOR
REPELLING INVASION.

HOW much, for some years past, we have been warned against *innovating* upon the Constitution, the reader need not to be reminded. He will find no innovation in the plan of defence now about to be submitted to him; but it will enable him to fix the stamp of dangerous and ruinous innovation upon other systems, which, unhappily for our country, have at different periods found introduction; and it will furnish him with a test for appreciating the new system of defence (whose ever it was) to which his Majesty's ministers have recently given their sanction.

It is to be kept in mind that our free Saxon militia wholly rests on *civil* foundations, and that arms-

bearing is only a part of the duty of every *citizen*, who, although occasionally *military*, is not so in the modern sense of the word, by which we now understand a soldier, hired for his "sold," or his pay, and subject to military law; that is, to the mutiny act, and to articles of war framed *by the king alone*. In the early periods of our constitution, before its genuine Saxon institutions were debased by the Norman alloy, the same elections gave at once civil power and military command; as must needs be the case when it was the object at once to organize the whole community for the purposes of regulation and security. How admirable the institution which gives the choice of military commanders to those whose liberties are the objects of preservation! and which never creates a military officer of important rank without constituting at the same time, and in the same person, a civil magistrate, necessitated to become conversant with the laws of his country, and having no interest but in preserving the Constitution!

The standing army of *Charles VII. of France*, was the first in Europe. His pretended fears of an invasion from the English, in order to recover their lost territories in that kingdom, together with the dread his subjects had of such an enemy, prevented them from seeing the danger to public liberty from this measure. *It soon brought the military power of the*

Feudatory barons into contempt, and their services in the field into disuse *.

Similar causes have produced similar effects on the condition of the modern representatives of the ancient barons of *England* : which causes, together with the consequences of the civil policy of *Henry VII.* have shorn the peerage of much of its ancient honours, and of its dignified estimation in the eye of the people ; as well as of its influence on the happiness of the country. The military commands in highest estimation, and which hold precedency in the field, formerly the grand theatre of the noble, are no longer theirs ; but in the hands of a profession. A nobleman now, if an insurrection spring up under his nose, or if a privateer land to pillage his estate, has no *power of the county*, to come at a call and repel the insult, or restore the public tranquillity. What could be so degrading to nobility, the descendants of ancient barons, as the infamous riots and conflagrations at *Birmingham*, when peers of the realm were seen soothing and flattering, and beseeching the miscreants they ought to have been in a situation of deterring from shewing their impious heads ; or to have crushed by the strong hand of military power, the moment they had commenced their mischiefs ?

* Robertson's Charles V. vol. I. p. 113.

And can the nobleman and man of family and fortune look back to that day of England's foul dishonour, when her capital was in flames, and at the mercy of the veriest brutes that ever bore human shape ; while lords were skulking from their habitations in affright ? Can they, I say, look back to such events, and not rejoice in helping to restore to full vigour and energy those laws which must at once give into their hands the whole military force of the kingdom, and to their country assured tranquillity and repose, although the storm of war were ravaging and afflicting every other state in *Europe* ?

In the enrolment of a militia, the first step dictated by reason is to secure, and to enforce, the arming of all without exception, to whom the *property* of a country belongs, and to whom its tranquillity is most an object of interest. This, in the writer's plan that has been spoken of, as published a few years ago, was therefore proposed. But in the case of the clergy, of female householders, a few official persons, and those above sixty years of age, the law was to describe some fit person, such as a relative, a domestic servant, or natural connexion, on whom the obligation should fall, of using the arms provided by the principal ; which, agreeably to ancient law and sound wisdom, should ever be kept in the house of the owner. On authority of

the calculations of Mr. *Pitt*, of these householders, I reckoned *eight hundred thousand*.

Then, in order to give this militia all the strength of its original institution, and in consideration of the inability of those beneath the condition of taxed householders, to bear the expense of fire-arms and accoutrements, it was proposed to provide arms at the public expense for *four hundred thousand* more: those arms being committed to the care of the tax-bearers, to whom of course they belonged, to be kept in the houses highest rated in every parish to the window tax, and, as nearly as might be, only one stand of such arms in a house. These *four hundred thousand* may be taken by ballot, from the untaxed part of the community, between the same ages as before, namely, 15 and 60; and such only as are able to bear arms.

But *all* such persons are members of the *posse comitatus*, that is, of the proper militia; *all* are liable to the burthen of defence, as *all* partake of the benefit of protection. It is very true: And *all* may be armed, according to their pecuniary ability; some with pikes or swords, and some with the *staves of peace*, now the ordinary weapon of the constable. As I am not now penning a statute, it is not necessary here to go into all the minutiae of organization; but it may be well to say that the proposal of keeping the fire-arms, purchased by the

holders of property, in their own possession, does not proceed from a desire of *disarming*; for all those of the ballot, for occasionally using those arms, ought to have arms of their own also, such as they could conveniently purchase: nor would I even debar such as chose it from arming themselves, at their own "costs and charges," with musquets, and keeping them in their own houses. Happy were it for our country had she a hardy peasantry, too high-minded to take the field with borrowed arms; and, armed as *property* ought to be, and fortified as it ought to be, by a law of arms and police suited to such a state of things, individuals of evil dispositions would feel a much tighter curb on their licentiousness, than any thing experienced since the original laws of the *posse comitatus* fell into disuse.

It was proposed to divide *England* into eight military districts; one of which should comprehend a large portion of the central country, rich in population; and each of the other seven, an extensive tract of coast, with a depth of country inland, until it there abutted upon the central district; excepting only the S. W. district, which was made to extend from *Abbotsbury* to the *Lands-end*, and from the *Lands-end* again to *Bristol*. Lines of bisection, from the coast inwards, were to cut each external district into two sub-divisions, of equal magnitude as nearly

as might be: But here again the peculiar situation and form of the S. W. district dictated a bisection from *Dartmouth* to *Biddeford*; that is, from coast to coast. The bisection of the central district ran from *Leicester* to *Leadbury*. But the whole distribution will be seen in the map prefixed to this work. I have now, for reasons that will arise, to suggest, in its proper place, a farther distribution of the maritime districts into *border* and *interior*; the border to extend about fifteen or twenty miles from the coast.

“ It is proposed that each of the first seven of these military districts should be wholly answerable, to the utmost of its ability, for the defence of its maritime border; and liable to sustain the charge of this defence by an equal assessment on property throughout its territory; with the exception of fortifying docks, or for other objects properly *national*, and for which parliament ought to provide; and with the farther exception of having, on occasions of real attack, such a certain reasonable reimbursement of a part of the expense from the central district, (to which every maritime district would be a protection) as parliament should direct. Thus the inhabitants of the coast, and of the most inland parts, would be completely *linked together in one interest and one duty*, and the exertion of all would be equally insured. On the same principle of law that we now,

in cases of loss by riot or insurrection, recover our damages of the *Hundred*, because it was the duty of its inhabitancy to have defended our property, every person who should suffer in his property from invasion of foreign enemies, ought equally to have his remedy at law, against the whole inhabitancy of the military district, or sub-division; not only as a matter of justice, but of sound policy.

“ But as the 5th, or South West military district, would have a double maritime frontier to defend, with comparatively a small inland territory and population for the supply of military strength; and as the central district would have no coast of its own, and would be very fruitful in people, it ought at all times of danger to furnish strong permanent succours towards the security of that weaker and more exposed district; especially as places of such importance as *Plymouth* and *Bristol* lie within its limits.

“ Nor is this all the military service to be required of the central district; it being intended as a resource to all the others; and its military force designed as an *army of reserve*, for supporting any and every other district that should stand in need of assistance: abutting upon every one of them except the 5th, for whose support provision is already made, its succours would always be at hand; and the intelligence of an enemy's appearance would be its signal for assembling a competent part of its force in the most

convenient quarters, to be held in readiness for a march: but such force ought not to advance until actual necessity required, and the proper orders arrived."

Here is a body which probably would be not less than *one hundred and sixty thousand* strong, that must ever remain as a true *army of reserve*. The circumstances attending the recent raising of one mercenary force of 40,000 for *Great Britain* only, called an *Army of Reserve*, and another of 60,000, called *Supplementary Militia*, are sufficient evidences that our military system wanted a complete reform. In mere bounties alone, without allowing for the very numerous desertions and the repetitions of bounties, the raising of these two bodies did not cost the country less than 3,500,000 pounds!

But, in order that neither the industry of the country might be too much interrupted*, nor its tranquillity unnecessarily disturbed, it is proposed that each military sub-division (being a considerable

* The use of standing armies depopulates in two ways: it not only deprives industry of so many hands as the armies contain, but it greatly discourages matrimony, and the rearing of families. Besides which, the dissolute manners of a professional soldiery have pernicious effects in society; which it should be an object of every wise statesman as much as possible to prevent.

tract of country) should, *in the first instance*, be answerable for repelling invasion on its own particular frontier, if such invasion were not very *formidable*; nor should the forces of the other part, even of the same district, march to its assistance without express orders from the commanding officer of that district: much less should the succours from the central district pass their own boundary, without a like order.

If, under such a system as we have proposed, the possibility of an hostile descent could be supposed, advantages not yet noticed would result.

As the *borders* of the maritime districts would always be the first scenes of action, it should be made the duty of all officers, residing within the same, to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the ground; and a general, together with an engineer, should at appointed times act as their instructors. As these officers of militia would necessarily have the post of honour, they would doubtless be ambitious to shew themselves worthy of it; studying to view the country with a military eye, and to distinguish all its points of strength, where an invading enemy could be best checked, or most effectually resisted; by means of woods, morasses, rivers, cliffs, the intersection of hedges, ditches or walls; or the positions of houses, mills, &c. &c. They would observe where roads could most easily be

broken up, and would keep in their minds the situations favouring an ambush; into which it should seem not difficult to draw an enemy on first entering a country, unless he employed a circumspection that must impede his progress.

Thus every gentleman of sense and reflection would become, in a considerable degree, a general and an engineer: he would feel confidence in his own powers, and have the confidence of those who served under him. No such officer could at any time traverse the country, whether on business or pleasure, without naturally amusing himself with its military capabilities. Besides, the *borders* being thus perfectly known to those charged with their defence, to excite their vigilance and inflame their courage, their own property and dwellings, their wives, parents, children and kindred, would be the immediate objects of their protection. These are considerations of no small importance; but which are wholly defeated by the present rule, of always removing the militia from its own county. The inhabitants of the interior part of each sub-division, being equally subject to all *expense* from a protraction of the war with those lying nearer the coast, would be prompt in bringing forward their succours, and ready with their purses for all measures calculated to keep distress and danger at a distance from themselves. The least they can in reason do is thus

to contribute equally to all *expense* with the inhabitants of the *borders*; who, in addition to their pecuniary contribution, must necessarily be the first to experience all the evils and all the dangers of invasion.

Why is the ship owner, besides his fair quota of public expense, to have thrown personally upon him an extra charge for any peculiar equipment of his coasting vessels? Why, in addition to his proportion of every tax, is the farmer inhabiting the *border*, to devote to the artillery the horses without which his land cannot be tilled? Why are the *borderers* to be at the sole expense of batteries, or lines, or other defences, on the coast, by which the inhabitants of the interior are thereby *equally* benefited, and *far more protected*? It is a case somewhat in point that, in the last war, a few individuals on the *Lincolnshire* coast, through zeal for the public service, erected beacons, flag-staves, &c. for making signals, and found in the end that their zeal was to be its own reward; for no soul contributed a farthing to the expense, nor was it defrayed by government.

He, who has ever read Doctor *Franklin's* admirable tale of a horseman losing his life by neglecting to replace in time a single nail in the shoe of his horse, will easily comprehend the fatal consequences that may ensue to the whole kingdom, from the want of a right system of union, (between those

who inhabit the *border* and those who dwell in the *interior*) in matters of common expense, and mutual protection and support.

The whole of this system would receive its life and energy from the nobility and gentry of the country, as then being the civil magistrates and military officers, by whom it must be carried into execution; and whose prime interest it would be to watch over the principles of its foundation, to cherish its spirit, and, by a due obedience to the laws enacted for its existence and regulation, carefully to guard against its neglect and decline. Thus would the noblemen and gentlemen of *England* once more rise from that dangling court dependence and frivolous insignificance, to which a mistaken government has in a great measure reduced them, to situations of real dignity and importance in the state; and, by taking their proper posts, civil and military, in such an organization, they would have every influence in their counties, and all that affection and attachment of their neighbours which are so grateful to men qualified to shine in such a sphere.

In respect to engineers and artillery, let the present corps, as seminaries, remain. But a contemplation of the foregoing system will shew it must put an end to all jealousy on the part of government; and, consequently, to whatever obstructs a complete defence of the country. In every sub-division, of

England, then, there ought to be, at least, four particular rallying-points, or *military stations*; which should be the depots of its cannon, with all their ammunition and apparatus. At these military stations, while the cavalry and light corps flew to the point of descent, to reconnoitre and to harass the enemy, the grand columns of infantry should first rendezvous, and with their own overwhelming numbers advance to put an end to the invasion and the invaders: not by attacking in bodies of unwieldy or unnecessary magnitude, but proportioned to that of the enemy; so that every man, of the body making an attack, might get into close fight; and so that, if the first attack failed, another with fresh troops might be made; and still, if necessary, another, and another, until farther resistance should be beyond the powers of exhausted human nature to support. But, whenever our superiority should be great, no attack ought to be made without first sending a summons to surrender, in hopes of preventing the effusion of human blood.

Cold and unfeeling must be the heart, and clouded the understanding, of that statesman, who does not provide for his country's defence in its *freedom*. What an idea do we form of the energies of liberty, when we contemplate *Attica*—whose territory was far less extensive than one subdivision of our proposed military districts—resisting the invasion of the Per-

sian monarch, the powerful descendant of the all-conquering *Cyrus*!—We see the Persian, to make sure of his prey, pour into this little Grecian state 100,000 chosen men. Ten thousand Athenian citizens arm, and march; and they are joined by one thousand Plataeans. Meanwhile the invaders penetrate to within twenty miles of *Athens*. Jealous of the Athenian fame, and anxious to share with their ally in the glory of defending their common country, or to perish in the attempt, the hardy sons of *Lacedæmon* march two hundred and ten miles in three days*.—Unparalleled effort! Glorious enthusiasm!—But they have the mortification to arrive too late. The eleven thousand have already triumphed, and immortalized the field of **MARATHON**!

* According to Dr. *Gillies*; but it seems to be an error. Although the question, respecting Greek measure, may not be decided among the learned, still the improbability of such a march being within the powers of an *army*, is strongly against the opinion of those who contend for the stadium being of so great a length as some represent. *Isocrates* calls this march 1500 stadia, which, at 604 English feet to the stadium, according to *Guilletiere*, brings it down to 137 miles and a fraction. This being nearly 46 miles a day, is still a surprising march for an *army* to continue for three successive days. This admeasurement corresponds tolerably with the distance between *Sparta* and *Marathon*, upon the maps in my possession.

perience an inconvenient *tax upon their time* in acquiring the military capabilities, by which they are to become a rampart to their country against gallie irruption, the necessity has been caused by that criminal neglect of the military energies of the Constitution which is complained of in these pages. Our statesmen are now bending the stubborn oak, because their predecessors did not bend the supple osier. Had every Englishman been made expert in military evolutions when a boy at school, we should not have had all this laborious drilling in advanced age. Had the whole community been early trained to arms, the use of them would have been through life easy, familiar, and pleasant; the occasional exercises at stated periods might be made agreeable recreations from business, and an annual meeting might be rendered an interesting military festival. *So methodised*, military attendances would not interrupt mercantile business; but *so prepared*, ENGLAND WOULD NEVER KNOW THE DANGER OF INVASION, NOR HEAR THE THREAT.

Considering that our rival is become a military despotism of the most formidable character, and that, in consequence of the recent additions of pay and allowances, *fifty thousand* troops now cost us more than *one hundred thousand* did ten years ago, every able citizen must now either become a bearer of arms, or too probably a hewer of wood and drawer of water.

Between two rival *nations*, both of which were *completely* armed, if either could entertain the mad idea of invading the other, the defensive nation, if she acted with common prudence, must soon wear out the other with expense. In order to *invade*, armies must be kept in the field, in all the forms, and with all *the expense* of war ; whereas, the nation to be attacked, especially if a sea intervene, may be carrying on all her productive operations of the plough, the anvil, and the loom, much the same as in peace ; and with no more troops in actual pay than just sufficient for centinels on the coast. Her country is her camp : on a signal she is under arms ; and wherever an enemy can land, he must be shortly met by a force infinitely superior, and one that must hourly increase in magnitude, as his melts away.

“ How far the author’s proposed military districts and sub-divisions of the kingdom, and the defensive arrangements locally belonging to each respectively, may be considered as an improvement of the ancient system, or preferable to modern districts without such arrangements, must be left to the decision of military and political judges.

“ To proceed a little farther in explanation, without attempting to go into very minute detail, he would then propose that each military sub-division of England should be farther divided into *weapon-takes*, agreeably to the ancient *military* division of our counties ; and that as many parishes, hamlets,

and townships as should contain 1800 taxable houses, (as nearly as might be), should be formed into one *weapon-take*. Then supposing, (for sake of the explanation) 1800 to be the precise number, each *weapon-take* would furnish its *brigade* of 2700 men. This force, with a view not only to national defence, but to the counteracting also of any inconvenient notions of equality, might be thus distributed:

No. I. EACH WEAPON-TAKE.					
Denominations.	Battalions.	Troops, or Companies.	Number in a Company.	Number in a Corps.	Number in the whole Establishment.
Cavaliers - - - -	0	1	60	60	26640
Gentlemen at Arms - -	0	1	60	60	26640
Grenadiers - - - -	1	10	50	500	222000
Light Infantry - - -	1	10	50	500	222000
Riflemen - - - -	0	1	62	62	27528
Column - - - -	3	18	51	918	407592
Reserve - - - -	1	8	50	400	177600
Light Artillery - - -	0	4	50	200	88800
Total in a Weapon-take -			2700		1,198800
Add the Fraction -					1200
Total in England - - -					1,200,000

As the *cavalry* would of course consist of none but men of rank, family, or fortune, as best able to keep at all times a military horse and furniture, the term *cavalry* would necessarily become a title of honour ; and, if it should be thought the application of the same term to the hired dragoons that might at any time be raised for foreign service, would counteract that effect, we might, by only reviving the well-known English name of *cavalier*, secure to the gentlemen who bore it the elevation and distinction here intended. The *gentlemen at arms*, being then taken from the most respectable persons for birth and property after the cavalry or cavaliers had been selected, would constitute another marked link in the chain of distinction ; and might have amongst them many even of the highest classes who might prefer the foot to the horse service.

Contemplating, not a momentary spirit of patriotism for a temporary occasion, but a permanent or rather perpetual and steady organization of national force, on the durable foundations of nature and simplicity, I cannot approve of men being lifted out of their natural stations in society, and set on horseback by the strength of private subscriptions ; for that breaks down the line of distinction which sound policy requires to be preserved.

In general, such a troop of horse and such a com-

pany of foot, as here proposed, might perhaps include all the persons in a *weapon-take* entitled to, or desirous of, a particular distinction. But as, in this system, contrary to that of a standing army, by conferring rank, elevation, and distinction, instead of loading the *public* with expense, we gain pecuniary resources, so there could be no objection to leaving these two corps open, for as many *volunteers* as should choose to serve in them, and who possessed the necessary qualifications appointed by law. And the same and other beneficial purposes would be answered if, in time of war, the cavaliers of a military sub-division should unite themselves into squadrons, of four troops each, and choose among themselves three field officers to each squadron; in which case the vacancies made by such election should be filled up again, so as still to have each troop fully officered without any field officer interfering with the separate business of a troop. And the like practice, with regard to the gentlemen at arms, might also have good effects. Nay, indeed, I see not why such unions might not be serviceable also in peace; and therefore become a regular part of the system. Our country, from the great prevalence of inclosures, being little adapted to cavalry, we ought to guard against an excess in that species of military force.

The following table will exhibit at once the force

“If you once violate principle, in steps “the fiend discretion,” with *exclusion* in one hand, and *monopoly* in the other, and liberty is no more. Now, no one, I believe, will maintain that those who are our taxed householders are those who should compose armies for *Gibraltar*, the *East or West Indies*, or for *Canada*; nor can any one shew the propriety of keeping up at an immense expense an hired army in *England*, always equal to the supply of such services. Here then is an unanswerable reason for training to fire-arms a great mass of those who are not householders, so that all foreign services may be promptly supplied by men used to such arms; and wanting nothing but the finishing touch of the adjutant to make them capital soldiers. Now the larger the mass of men fit for such services unquestionably the better; and the more easily, promptly, and economically they will be furnished: besides that, in the eye of every wise statesmen, to diffuse as widely as possible the true genuine military spirit is to exalt the national character.

“For farther arguments in favour of this strength, I refer my reader to the consideration of the rivalry of *France*; of her immense power; of the folly there would be in our disarming *in time of peace*, and, finally, whether the author of these pages be not right in proposing a system by which the most energetic invasion, by that energetic despotism, might

be defeated with as much ease, as a well armed city quells a paltry riot in its streets. *England* once armed as he proposes, were all *Europe* to crusade it to her holy land, no heart would palpitate with apprehension; no countenance would be overcast with gloom. There would be no bustle in the cabinet; no crude acts to frame in parliament; no alarm; no trouble; no *expense*; no hurry-skurry through the country; no motley medley of military associations to form; nor costly armies to be encamped here, nor barracked there: but an armed people, with a dignified serenity, enlivened only by an animation and ardour natural to the occasion, would come forth to smite the daring foe, as a bridegroom cometh out of his chamber, and as a strong man rejoiceth to run a race*.

In order, if necessary, to pay still farther attention to the civil ranks of men, than appears already visible on the face of the system, those of the infantry who were of the superior orders in society, might have an option, provided they had the bodily qualifications, of serving in the *flank companies*, who, on that account, should be entitled to wear some mark of distinction; and these distinc-

* This paragraph has not been composed in 1803; but, with the exception of a single word, is a literal copy of what was written in 1798.

tions in favour of rank and property might be rendered particularly subservient to the interests of the service, by requiring the cavaliers, the gentlemen at arms, and the flank-company men, as well as all officers, in proportion to their rank, to contribute more largely than others to the contingent expenses of the service ; such as furnishing artillery, horses, ammunition, &c.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that the grenadiers and light infantry ought to be selected for activity and bodily vigour ; and the reserve be composed of the striplings and the aged. To the latter, of course, would fall all stationary services, and such as partook of the nature of garrison duty ; as well as convoys and escorts, the superintendence of pioneering, intrenching, breaking up of roads, &c. for it is only in the last resort they ought to engage an invading enemy.

“ The next question is how to train so immense a body of troops as 1,200,000 ; for although we have seen in *France* as great a number brought to the highest perfection of discipline, it will be said, we must not expect the like exertion, without a like necessity ; and it may be thought that, in time of peace, our armed *posse* would degenerate into as errant *trained bands* or rather *untrained* bands, as were ever in *London* the objects of derision. But those, who are apt to under-rate what are called un-

disciplined soldiers, will do well to recollect the battle of *Jemappe*, and the early victories of *Pichegru*: nor may it be amiss to consult *Lord Clarendon*, who, speaking of the battle of *Newbury*, says, “ The London trained bands, and auxiliary regiments, (of whose inexperience of danger, or any kind of service beyond the easy practice of their postures in the artillery-garden, men had till then too cheap an estimation) behaved themselves to wonder; and were, in truth, the preservation of that army that day; for they stood as a bulwark and rampire to defend the rest, &c. &c.” b. 7, p. 347.

“ I should not now go farther than principles and outlines, were it not necessary so far to touch on detail as to obviate superficial objections, which might create a prejudice to the true constitutional system of arming; in which I must request the patience of the instructed reader, while I address a few observations to those of less information.

“ The foundation of the system being the legal obligation of *all men*, under high penalties, to obey the civil magistrates “ upon cry made for weapons “ to keep the peace*,” in order forcibly to suppress all riot or insurrection, as well as to join the king’s generals, for repelling invaders; it follows that *the*

* *Popbam*, 121, 122. *Jones’s Legal Mode of suppressing Riots*, 27.

possession of arms, and arms adequate to such services, is the DUTY of all who are of ability to purchase them*.

“ The many ancient laws for musters of arms, and for giving skill in the use of them, ought to be judiciously revived; the spirit of them to be preserved; and all those defects which occasioned their falling into disuse, ought to be judiciously amended, by applying the intention of them to the arms now in use, and by introducing into those laws a *self-enforcing* principle. If England have men deserving the name of statesmen, this, notwithstanding the luxury and the commercial spirit of the age, might doubtless be done.

“ The great and excellent Sir *William Jones*, in his work before referred to, (p. 10) had said, “ In this awful interval a question occurred to me, “ which must naturally have presented itself to many “ others: *Whether the still-subsisting laws and genuine constitution of England had not armed “ the CIVIL STATE with a power sufficient, if it “ had been previously understood and prepared, to “ have suppressed ever so formidable a riot without “ the intervention of the military.”*

“ If no such power legally existed in the state, “ our system, I thought, must be defective in a most

* *Popham*, 28, and *Sharp's Free Militia*, 7, 6, 10, 11, &c.

“ essential point; since no people can be really and
 “ substantially free, whose freedom is so *precarious*,
 “ in the true sense of the word, as to depend on the
 “ protection of the *soldiery*; and even our protectors,
 “ who for several days possibly could not, but cer-
 “ tainly did not, act at all*, might have been neces-
 “ sarily called away, in the most dangerous mo-
 “ ment, to defend our coasts and maritime towns:
 “ if, on the other hand, such a power of self-pro-
 “ tection did exist, our laws, I concluded, must
 “ have been *disgracefully neglected*, and OUGHT
 “ TO BE RESTORED TO FULL VIGOUR AND
 “ ENERGY.”

Afterwards, in p. 34, he says, “ To what fatal
 “ cause must we ascribe a neglect so shameful and
 “ so dangerous? I answer boldly, yet I hope with-
 “ out arrogance, since I use the very words of
 “ *Blackstone, to the vast acquisition of force aris-*
 “ *ing from the riot-act and the annual expedient*
 “ *of a STANDING ARMY*; which has induced a
 “ disposition, cherished by the indolence natural to
 “ man, and promoted by the excessive voluptuous-
 “ ness of the age, to look up solely for protection
 “ to the executive power and the soldiery; *a dispo-*
 “ *sition which must instantly be shaken off, if any*
 “ *spark of virtue remain in our bosoms.*”

* He is speaking of the London riots in 1780. ~

“ Skill in the use of arms should be made an essential and indispensable part of the education of youth. Like swimming, it is an art best learnt when we are boys, and never leaves us when men. From this single regulation all *future* difficulty, in having a community of free soldiers, vanishes in a moment : and, when the importance of the duty is duly considered, it ought by the strictest sanctions to be enforced.

“ Although it has been suggested that persons in the highest ranks and of most opulence should form the cavalry, it is not proposed to have a stable at every school, filled with military horses. Let the foot exercise alone be taught at the seminaries of learning. It will be soon enough for the cavalry exercise, when the students shall have left their tutors. It is conceived that no exercise can be more healthy, and few exercises so delightful to the youth of large schools, as military manœuvres ; which are in fact beautiful practical lectures on mechanics ; at the same time that they are manly and animating in a high degree.

“ The author could undertake to furnish a short essay on *military language*, which renders the whole science of manœuvres perfectly simple and intelligible. The best writers on military manœuvres appear to have fallen into the same sort of mistake that, Mr. Tooke says, Locke fell into, in

respect of his celebrated Essay on Human Understanding; by not considering how much it was a treatise on *words*.

“ ’Tis not laboured explanations of the minutiae of manœuvres, but a correct and universal application of *words* of command, in which lies the true secret of manœuvres. The accident alluded to does the whole business: it is perfectly easy to learn; and, if it were once made the rule of the service, there is no manœuvre, whatever, which a battalion would not perform at the mere *word of command*, although neither the officer who gave the word, nor his manœuvre, had ever been seen or heard of by the battalion before that moment.

“ The next generation being thus prepared, the present age, in consequence of the vast military force—vast when considered as a *hired* army—now on foot, can be at no loss to get competently instructed; and, indeed, the almost universal application to the military exercise, throughout the kingdom, happily removes every possible doubt as to the practicability of this part of our system. The labour of the work, in fact, is in a great measure already accomplished; so that all we want, for rendering the good effects permanent, is “ to restore to full vigour and energy” our ancient arming laws.

“ Although the poverty of the public finances makes it necessary to get rid of our enormous mili-

tary expenses as expeditiously as possible, yet the security of the country must at all events be, in the first instance, provided for; and the disbanding of these forces should proceed gradually, according to the progress made in arraying and training the inhabitants. In this disbanding of the present soldiery, those who had trades and occupations to return to, and were desirous of their discharge, should be the first released.

“The *supplementary* branch alone of our proposed national force would be able to receive into it, and enrol, *the whole of the present army*; and their arms might be purchased as before provided for*. Thus restoring to agriculture, arts and manufactures, an immense body of men, for productive labour, to sustain and enrich the state by their industry; instead of lying as they now do in an unproductive state, a grievous burthen on the industry of the remaining part of the community.

* In the minutes of the council in the reign of Elizabeth, there is this entry—“That order be taken, that arms may “be served at *reasonable rates* at the armourer’s office at Plymouth.” *Defensive War*, 23. I see that government has wisely adopted this rule for supplying such of the armed associations as choose to provide their own arms. And the base condition of returning the arms of other associations, it is to be hoped, will be changed into a payment in money of the value of them.

Here it is material to notice certain words which fell from Mr. *Yorke*, while Secretary at War, on the 20th of June, 1803. Our military system he thought so defective, it required to be “probed to the bottom,” and completely reformed. “At the commencement of war,” he remarked that “the state of our military preparation has never at all corresponded with the means of exertion which the country possessed.” And how should it, if that preparation is to consist of standing forces, unless we had a military peace establishment which no attainable revenue could maintain, and with which no freedom could exist? During the continuance of peace, preparedness for war, with *economy in finance*, and security to freedom, can only be had by restoring the MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION, and preserving it in FULL VIGOUR AND ENERGY. Out of a mere standing army, no additional force, on the commencement of war, can of itself shoot forth: such an army can only be augmented by dint of expense:

In mere *bounty money* alone, the *Army of Reserve*, as an augmentation to the regulars, has, this year, taking the average no higher than *thirty-five pounds per man*, cost Great Britain in the first instance, not less than *one million four hundred thousand pounds*. Then comes numerous repetitions of the bounty, in consequence of desertions. And

as recruiting for the militia is become equally expensive, followed by the parochial maintenance of soldiers' families, the great increase of wages in husbandry, from the scarcity of hands, and many losses resulting from an actual want of labourers, the entire burthen of first raising, and then maintaining the armies of *England*, is an impressive call upon her statesmen, to "*probe to the bottom*" her military system. And what expense, *in this way*, can insure us peace, so long as *France* shall retain her present strength, and the command of the sea-coast from the *Danish Sound* to the *Venetian Gulph* !

Wretched, in every view of it, is a wrong military system. But that system once properly corrected, then all in an instant would be economy, strength, and security. Had it been the first care of Mr. *Addington's* administration to have seen *twelve hundred thousand* men armed, as proposed in these pages, where the work is only a second edition of what was published early in 1799, *he would not have needed to have made an humiliating peace, nor would he have been driven at all into a new war*; and, in such a case, for a French Consul to have imposed upon his subjects the burthen of building gun-boats, and to have threatened us with invasion, would have been to have made himself the laughing stock of *Europe*. Had we even been vulnerable in any distant quarter of the

world, and had *France* possessed the means of conveying thither her armies, out of our supplementary militia of *four hundred thousand* men, our regular forces might at any time have been rapidly augmented ; for, out of an armed and warlike population, regular armies, at the disposal of the crown, as spontaneously grow as bursts from the wide branching arms of our native oak a luxuriant foliage.

Thus have we, at once, probed our military system to the bottom ; and shewn the mode of its complete reform. Defective as may be the new statutes, in having a duration only for the continuance of the war, and likewise in other respects, they will nevertheless have made no inconsiderable advance in the road of military reformation ; and will have put in training such a proportion of the civil state as to facilitate an early completion of that work. As fast as that training, and the formation of distinct corps can be carried into execution, the present expensive military establishments may be reduced, *even in the time of war* ; for, with a *posse comitatus*, or natural militia, such as it ought to be, and such as it speedily may be, whenever ministers will energetically set about it, we assuredly could not of necessity need any more regular forces than our foreign services should require ; as I trust will hereafter more clearly appear. And how strongly does the magnitude of

our debt, the weight of our taxes, and the probable length of the present struggle, if not wisely conducted, inculcate such policy !

“ *Lord Liverpool*, in 1757, speaking of the pecuniary burthen of standing forces compared with that of a militia, supposing the latter to be in pay only during its days of exercise, says “ *it will surpass it in expense by almost twenty times the sum.*” But we now see a *militia* itself, of nearly *an hundred thousand men*, made *standing forces*, and maintained at the full charge of troops of that description. And so much have the troops of these descriptions been of late courted, by an augmentation of pay and allowances, that the burthen is become truly intolerable ; and the very cost of our defence, unless we adopt a wiser system, must be our ruin. And after such an addition to *an immense standing army*, augmented also by corps of fencibles and other cavalry, raised all over the kingdom by *very expensive modes*, and upheld by dint of grievous taxes, what is the result of the whole ?—Why, truly, the country is not safe, without an act of parliament for a general arming of the inhabitants !—without calling on every individual man to offer his *personal services* for public defence !——Is it in the power of ridicule, so completely to expose the fatal error of our policy, as it is exposed by the passing of such an act ? After paying for *one year's*

defence of our island, very much more than its whole rental, and experiencing the most dangerous inroads on our constitution into the bargain, we are come at last to personal service, where we ought, to have set out, and by which, regulated according to the constitution, we might have saved at least nineteen parts in twenty of our land expense! Can the genius of ridicule, I again ask, produce such a satire on the system of "the three last centuries"?

Recollecting our distinction of the self-armed, and the supplementary, the first consisting of 800,000 and the latter of 400,000, we see that the nation may, not only be eased of an immense burthen, by speedily disbanding the whole of what is now called its militia, and, for aught that I can see to the contrary, a considerable proportion of its regular force also; but that, in the very act of so doing, it would furnish itself with a supplementary *posse comitatus* of disciplined soldiers, equal in number to the diminution of the mercenaries; whereby it would not only have the benefit of a vast saving, but it would restore to agriculture and manufacture the powers of a greater production. Ministers would no longer, from the poverty of the treasury, notwithstanding the pressure on the people of a war taxation, be under the necessity of rejecting the ser-

vices, and wounding the feelings, of volunteer corps in all parts of the kingdom. And while the spirit of the people is flowing in a full tide of patriotism to take up arms for their country, and that country has already military instructors enow for training its *posse comitatus*, ministers have no impediment to encounter: but have the strongest invitation, and the most powerful inducements, to render their country this great and invaluable service; more great, and more glorious, in my mind, than was rendered her either by *Magna Charta*, or the *Revolution*.

This grand improvement in our situation once made, our statesmen could no more lament our future unpreparedness for war; and would thereby be enabled early to obtain, and then to preserve to us, honourable and permanent peace. But what an impression it would make on all those nations around, now crouching under the rod of *France*, to see *England*, not only contending single-handed with the giant they dread, but, in the midst of the conflict, reducing her war taxes, disbanding and sending to their homes her mercenary troops, and growing stronger and stronger, as she more and more confided in the swords of her citizens!

O! where is that statesman whom modern degeneracy had not reached, and the features of whose character had the hardihood of antiquity! No state

chicanery, no narrow system of vicious politics, sunk him to the level of the vulgar great. Without dividing he destroyed party; without corrupting he made a venal age unanimous. *France* sunk beneath him. With one hand *he smote the house of Bourbon*, and *wielded in the other the democracy of England**!

But let us proceed: "Although the officers of a *posse comitatus*, to follow the good *Saxon* custom, ought to be appointed by election, yet, consulting the repose, the dignity, the strength, and permanency of government, at the same time that we look to the solid securities of freedom, it might be sound policy not altogether to overlook those gradations in society which are created by birth, station, knowledge, and property, which contribute to order and subordination; wherefore suitable qualifications for holding the different military ranks might be required. With regard to the question—In whom should reside the power of election? The answer undoubtedly must be, in the community for whose use and protection the power is to be entrusted, and to whom those who exercise it are to be responsible. The *basis* of this power should doubtless be in the general

* Extracted from a character of Lord Chatham, circulated as a hand-bill.

court of the *weapon-take*, consisting of all taxed householders; with a right of resuming to itself the full exercise of that power, if ever the delegations of it, dictated by convenience, should be abused. Thus a suitable responsibility of the military officers throughout the kingdom might be established.

“ By thus returning to the election of all officers of the militia, we should but be so far on our way to a reform of our civil elections. The constitution certainly intended, and for several ages as certainly provided, that all magistrates and officers, whose functions immediately affected the people, should be elected by the people; because it is fit that the salutary influence of true popular election should have a perpetual operation, and influence, on the mind of every person exercising power on which the people’s peace, protection, liberty, and happiness immediately depend.

I must be understood to speak of *reformed* elections; not such elections as, for the most part, seats in parliament now depend upon.

“ The people of every decennary or tything, or ten households, formerly elected not only the constable, then called chief-pledge, or tithing-man, who was at once both the civil magistrate and the military commander of the tithing, equivalent in

military rank to the modern *serjeant*, but they elected also “ *the hundreders*, (who had the civil “ authority of high constable and *justiciaries*, and “ the military rank of *captains*) and the viscounts “ or *sheriffs*; and likewise the *heretochii*, or leaders of the armies; the same (says the learned “ Judge *Atkins*) as, in the dialect of the present “ age, may be called the lord-lieutenants or deputy “ lieutenants*.”

And *Atkins* also observes, that “ Sir *Edward Coke*, in his 2d Institute, in his Exposition of the “ Stat. of Winchester, 1 cap. 10, concerning the “ elections of *coroners* by the freeholders†, (which “ ever was so, and so still continues) says, there is “ *the same reason* for election of *sheriffs*, and so “ it anciently was, by writ directed to the coroner. “ In like manner were the conservators of the peace “ chosen, in whose place the *justices of the peace* “ now succeed. These were great and high liberties, and did belong to the *freeholders from all* “ *antiquity*, &c‡.”

“ Here we see how well founded was Mr. *Pitt*’s observation, that “ the *principle* of the English

* *Sharp on Congregational Courts*, p. 156.

† By *freeholders* is meant *liberi tenentes*, the free-holders in *burgage* tenure, viz. the “ *householders*.” *Ib.* 197.

‡ *Parliamentary and Political Tracts*, 253, 254.

" constitution is REPRESENTATION." It is indeed its very soul, and once pervaded every member and every fibre with life and energy. All magistracies, civil, military, and judicial, were elective; and juries were drawn with such impartiality, from the mass of the people, as to have the true quality of representation; even the office of *King* amongst the Saxons was elective originally. I shall only add, that, whatever may be thought of the necessity of other magistracies and authorities being representative, it is indispensable that three of them be strictly so: *viz. The House of Commons, Juries, and the Military Commands* in an armed inhabitancy.

" It is impossible that LAWS should be "*the state's collected will,*" unless made by those who are elected by, and truly represent, the people: it is equally impossible to be tried "*by God and our country,*" unless the law be *vox populi*, which makes it *vox Dei**; and unless our jury be drawn from the mass of the community with such impartiality and fairness as virtually, and in all rational

* It is not in a vulgar and presumptuous sense this ancient sentiment is quoted; for if our law be "*the gathered wisdom of ages*" and "*the perfection of reason,*" then it is not only *the voice of the people*, but figuratively (and the figure is beautiful and expressive) it is *the voice of God* also.

effect, to be that "*country*" by which alone an Englishman can be legally judged. And it being an admitted principle that no nation can preserve its liberties, unless it keep the sword in *its own hands*, it were the height of absurdity for *an armed people* not to elect all those under whose guidance they should be arrayed and led to battle.

"But, as to the king alone it appertains to have intelligence of the designs and movements of foreign enemies, and to plan the general operations for defeating invasion, we see the reason why generals, being entrusted with the execution of these plans and operations, should be of the king's appointment.—How admirable is this whole system! How invaluable the genuine constitution of *England*!

"First, the people, by their *representatives*, are to make their own laws: Secondly, by their *representatives*, those laws are to be applied to their own actions: And, thirdly, in *their own persons*, under the guidance of *representatives* elected for the purposes of order and regularity, they are to defend their laws and liberties with *their own swords*; for this last is a case to which, by a law of nature, it is ordained that representation cannot extend: for that nation which parts with its sword parts with its liberty; and the sum of its subsequent enjoyment is mere legal protection, at the discretion of those who have got possession of the sword:—So true it

is that "the possession of arms is the distinction between slaves and freemen." And how grand a feature it is in the character of the ancient Saxon, and how true to nature, that the form of manumitting his slave, was the gift of A SWORD AND A SPEAR*! How sinks in the comparison the Roman woollen cap?

"Here I would expostulate with those who "despair of the commonwealth," and, exhausted of all hope of *reform*, see no prospect of liberty but in a *Revolution*. By those best acquainted with constitutional learning it has been an old observation that, if the constitution were utterly lost and forgotten, could but its principles be re-discovered and collected, its existence would be soon restored. If such a restoration has been considered as a natural effect of such a cause under such circumstances, how encouraging are our prospects, who have never lost a knowledge of these principles; who must now practically, and daily, feel their intrinsic excellence; and to whom it must be apparent that either a settled despotism, a revolution†, or a reform, must be the termination of the present state of things! for

* *Historical Dissertation on the Antiquity of the English Constitution*, 185.

† Whether we would avert a revolution by domestic convulsion or foreign conquest, we must fly to *reform*.

that a decided and vast majority of the nation, even of those whose confidence in ministers, and whose blindness to corruption and abuse, have been the most remarkable, will, in the hour of peril, when the storm threatens to burst, prefer reform to either despotism or revolution my mind is not of a texture to doubt.

“ It is obvious that, on the first revival of the system of the *posse comitatus*, much legal regulation would be wanting that afterwards would become useless ; and that different regulations would also be necessary in peace and in war : it might, therefore, be adviseable to frame *three* distinct statutes. The *first* should lay foundations only. The *second* statute should carry up the superstructure, and include every thing necessary to giving it effect in time of **PEACE**. And the *third* solely apply to **WAR**.

“ By this act, the duties of war might be clearly pointed out, and the most prompt alacrity secured ; not merely on the cold principle of military obedience, but on those also of a common duty and interest, felt and understood, of national honour, which should not fail to operate ; and of genuine patriotism, which should excite the most lively enthusiasm. To each of these statutes should be assigned, with accurate discrimination, its proper class

of enactments ; so that the separate provisions of each should have the most complete perspicuity.

“ Here, then, are our means of raising the people *en masse*, for national defence ; and of calling into orderly action every particle of the physical power of the state. If these means were not found by the *Emperor* in his need, it was because an arbitrary government, forbidding the means, is of course denied the end. It is the prerogative of a free nation alone to be unconquerable except by extermination. Although an arbitrary government be formidable indeed to its own disarmed, ignorant, enslaved, and oppressed subjects, it is too feeble to resist the attacks of an armed people ; and in the day of trial must fall !

“ The sole material difficulty, attending the whole system, will be that of framing the second of the three proposed statutes. The care of our ancestors, to insure *the possession of arms*, is seen in their various enactments to that effect ; “ and as much as our progenitors are famed for sometimes indulging their genius, a butt of Malmsey could not find its way into their cellars without a sheaf of arrows for its passport *.” We may, indeed, easily secure an effectual *muster of arms*, which is in fact THE

* Lord Hawkesbury's Discourse, p. 32, 58, 63.

ROCK OF OUR FOUNDATION; and we may, without difficulty, enforce a sufficient training of select corps, and of "the nerves and ligaments" of our military body; so as on any alarm of danger, to be soon in a posture of unassailable defence. But he who has read the human heart, and has any taste for that policy which from early antiquity to the present hour has been the admiration of the wise and the good, will know how desirable it is to aim at higher and nobler ends; and to a wise law-giver how practicable it is thus to unite the exercise of rights with the performance of duties; thus to combine public services with public honours; and thus to render even manly pastimes, and elegant pleasures, subservient to the noblest purposes of public good; so as to give to a law for upholding in constant vigour this system, at once so comprehensive and so grand, **A SELF-INFORCING PRINCIPLE**, adequate to the great end in view—that of preserving, in full splendour, during the security of peace, those military virtues that are our safety in war; on which account it was that "the public games of ancient governments consisted principally of martial entertainments." And from the noble author I am now quoting, I must also transcribe an account of a military festival observed by the modern Swiss, which is worthy of admiration: "The surprising acts of valour, which the Swiss militia has performed,

“ has induced an ingenious writer to draw a paral-
 “ lel between the military achievements of this lit-
 “ tle collection of cantons, and those of the free
 “ states of Greece : He puts in competition with
 “ the battle of Marathon that of Morgarten ; where
 “ 1300 Swiss routed the army of the Archduke
 “ Leopold, consisting of 20,000 men, and killed
 “ twice their own number : He considers the action
 “ of Sempach, where the same Arch-duke lost his
 “ life, and 20,000 of his men were routed by 1600
 “ Swiss, as a more surprising victory than that of
 “ *Platea* ;—and, to crown all, the battle that was
 “ fought in the pass of *Weven*, in the canton of
 “ *Glaris*, is a copy that exceeds its original which
 “ was fought at *Thermopylæ* ; for as 300 *Spartans*
 “ tried to repel the army of *Persia* in those streights,
 “ and all perished in the attempt ; so, in such ano-
 “ ther defile, 350 *Swiss* attacked at least 8000
 “ *Austrians*, and gained the field of battle.”

“ It is surprising,” says this author, “ what a
 “ spirit the remembrance of this action instils into
 “ this people : they yearly celebrate it by a pub-
 “ lic procession on the spot where it was fought ;
 “ and where eleven pillars, erected for that pur-
 “ pose, shew the places where those heroes eleven
 “ times rallied : at each pillar they offer up thanks
 “ to God ; and, when they come to the last, one
 “ of their best orators makes a panegyric in praise

“ of these three hundred and fifty men, and at the
 “ end of his oration reads a list of their names, in
 “ the same manner as the *Spartans* had the names
 “ of those who fell at Thermopylæ carved on
 “ brass, to transmit their fame to posterity.”

“ To frame institutions for preserving alive a true martial spirit in the profound security of peace, is indeed a task demanding the penetration of an *Aristotle*, the genius of a *Plato*, the energy of a *Lycurgus*, and the virtue of an *Aristides*;—in short, demanding one worthy to tread in the hallowed footsteps of the god-like *Alfred*;—but, alas! the tear which rushes to my eye reminds me *Jones* is no more!—What he could have atchieved alone must therefore be extracted from the collected wisdom and joint labours of several; and thus the system receive the last finishing touch of excellence; fitting it to impress on the national character the indelible stamp of dignity and independence, and the military aspect of high-souled freedom. And it is our consolation that in our books, and I trust also in the hearts of thousands, are to be found the principles on which our system must rest; and that we have men capable of their application.”

The author has himself, in his late work, entitled, “*THE TRIDENT*,” suggested, and pointed out the advantages of periodical GAMES and FESTIVALS, as well as of occasional celebrations of na-

val and military TRIUMPHS, at a magnificent *hieronauticon* or *naval temple*, proposed to be erected on a great scale near the metropolis, as a monument of national glory, a nursery of national art, and a school of national manners and public virtue.

It would not only add great lustre to such festivals for a large brigade of the ARMED PEOPLE to assist at the celebrations, but it must likewise produce effects the most beneficial.

Such a brigade, draughted in proportion to population from all the military districts of the kingdom, and the individuals taken, partly by *right*, in consequence of *recorded merit*, and partly by *election*, would constitute, as it were, a body of deputies from a martial nation to a congress of national art, arms, emulation and glory. Previously encamped at the *Hiernauticon*,

“ Sacred to virtue, valour, genius, taste*.”

to prepare for their evolutions in the presence of an assembled people, flocking from all parts of the empire, and from every civilized state ; and in the presence, more especially, of the best soldiers of all countries, attracted as were the Greeks to *Olympia*, to witness the gay, the solemn, and the splendid spectacles, how would it be possible, for the armed citizens of such a brigade, not to feel the same in-

* Trident, p. 87.

spiration as formed such men as *Xenophon* and *Epaminondas*? And what a perpetual stimulus would here be, throughout the whole *posse comitatus*, to secure the honour of being in the brigade on these occasions! How would it be possible, that such institutions should not elevate the national character, and improve the national taste; or not be productive of excellence of every kind? Here, then, is one of those *self-enforcing* principles, by which our revived *posse comitatus* might be preserved from future decay.

The following ode, intended for insertion at p. 197 of "*The Trident*," in a second edition, being not unsuitable to the present occasion, as alluding to the two grand essentials, *civil* and *military*, of the constitution, is here presented to the reader, who must suppose himself at a national festival in the *Hieronauticon*, where, after the repast, this ode is the prelude to other musical entertainments.

1.

CELESIAL maids! High-minded youth!

Bright gems of chastity and truth—

Adorn the Bard *! Fill high the mantling bowl!

* The bard is attended to the banquet by his three pages: the first, bearing his *sword and spear*; the second, his *embroidered robe*; and the third, his *cap of liberty and oaken crown*; with which paraphernalia, as preparatory to his

Then, as the purple tide flows round,
 Lov'd Harp! thy wild Æolian sound
 Shall 'trance*, with tones divine, each hero's soul!

2.

Responsive to a wond'rous hand,
 Thou once obey'dst a king's command;
 To ALFRED, once, thou gav'st thy magic voice,
 The Muses, to our plains, to win,
 Ferocious Danes from blood to wean,
 And works of gentle peace to make their choice.

3.

This birth-right sword, gird on, and near,
 Firm plant *that* guardian, glitt'ring spear†;

celebrating, with due solemnity, the fame of *Albion*, he desires to be adorned by the hands of high-born beauty and heroism, that he may feel the inspiration of their influence, and that his strains may have their full effect, by his personal dignity being thus supported in the eyes of his assembled country, and of the illustrious of other nations, present at the banquet.

* This word is here used metaphorically, to signify that the music shall cause the faculties to be so wholly absorbed by its charms, that the nerves shall be lost, as in a trance, to any consciousness of whatever else may be passing around them.

† Arms-bearing being the eternal distinction between freemen and slaves, the emancipation of a bondman, among

Then o'er me fling *this* damask'd robe of law *,
 With duties wrought, and rights, of man;
 Sage legislation's noblest plan,
 A state well-pois'd to rule, and statesmen awe.

4.

Let these grey locks, and wrinkled brows,
 Gay Freedom's classic cap inclose,
 With verdant foliage, rich, of oaken crown *;
 Then, fair and brave companions, I,
 In eagle notes, that soar the sky,
 Will warble mighty Albion's high renown.

the *Saxons*, was effected and evidenced by the public, and solemnly-performed gift of a *sword and a spear*—a ceremony true to the simplicity and dignity of nature, and forming noble contrast to the mummary and meanness of the ceremony of emancipation among the *Romans*; who, in truth, had little knowledge of the true principles of civil liberty: By speaking of his "birthright sword," the bard, in the outset, lays claim to all the rights and honours of a man *born* to freedom.

* The Author, since composing this Ode, has been much gratified to find that, for *adorning* his bard, as a prelude to his rehearsing, in epic song, the deeds of his hero, he has the authority of *Milton*; who speaks of "a poet, soaring in the high regions of his fancy, with his *garland* and *singing robes* about him."—See Reasons of Church Government in Birch's Collection, 1, 59.

While I, immortal ALFRED! sing,

With pathos, sweep the SAXON string * !

The rapt'rous strain be, patriot spirit ! thine † !

In ALBION's cause, each bosom fire !

A love of LIBERTY inspire,

Intrepid, pure, unperishing, divine !

“ Supposing the *weapon-takes*, so formed as has been stated, to be at the same time our elective districts for returning one member each to the House of Commons, perhaps there could not be a more suitable division of the country, or of the community, for such a purpose. It is apparent that, in the formation of either *weapon-takes*, or *elective districts*, the right principle of division is by *population* ; whereas the formation of military *districts*, as well as of *counties*, will best be governed on principles of *space*. And if, on the mature consideration of military men, it should appear that our dis-

* As all English liberty and good government flows from the clear and wholesome fountain of our Saxon Constitution, so that fountain, whenever the stream becomes obstructed, or turbid with impurity, we must ascend, for the waters of political life ; taking care to restore their free and healthful current ; and to exclude from their channel the sluggish, foul and noxious waters of servitude and debasement.

† In the strain of *Alfred*, let parliaments and princes legislate and rule, and then, they need no *higher* felicity or praise,

tricts and sub-divisions, as well as the arrangements proposed, are rightly calculated for answering the ends in view, it would then at least be *desirable* that no difficulties should stand in the way of correcting the present extreme and very inconvenient inequality of our counties; and of completing our system by new modelling them: for as a principle part of the merit of the system consists in having an armed inhabitancy to constitute the strength of the *civil power*, so that system must attain to the highest degree of perfection, when the civil and military divisions of the country are correspondent, and the arrangements of the two services go hand in hand, mutually serving and supporting each other. This union of the two duties was strictly attended to by *Alfred*; although he left the disproportions between the counties much as we have found them. When we contemplate the simplicity, uniformity, and exact proportions of the other parts of his system, we must conclude some insuperable difficulty stood in the way; or that he would have perfected the divisions of his kingdom by an equalization of the counties.

But, doubtless, had the *Danes* been as formidable to him as the *French* are to us, he would have made all minor considerations give way to the indispensable one of combining with every portion of the coast, its full proportion of the inland country, by an indissoluble union for its support and defence, as

proposed in these pages ; where it will be seen that the sea-shore of every sub-division is, as it were, the front of an immense military column reaching to the very centre of the kingdom ; organized into every useful species of corps, but under one supreme head ; ever in readiness at a moment's warning ; and its collected force consisting of an army immensely more numerous than any that could possibly be brought against it. "Having shewn," says Sir *William Jones*, "the nature and extent of the "*posse comitatum*, and proved that it is required "by law to be equal in its exertion to a *well-disciplined army*, I have established the proposition which I undertook to demonstrate *."

"Should it ever be thought adviseable to equalize the counties, the number of them might be kept nearly the same as at present, by comprehending three counties in each military sub-division, making in the whole forty-eight, instead of fifty-two. In this distribution, an annexation of adjoining *weapon-takes*, equal to about the third part of the *surface* of a military sub-division would constitute a county.

"Should either prejudice or other more substantial reason stand in the way of perfecting our system of defence, on the best and clearest principles, by altering the present limits of counties, perhaps it

* Inquiry into the Legal Means of suppressing Riots, 34.

might be a good expedient to form our districts and sub-divisions by throwing into them the counties as they now stand, which might be done thus, viz.

First.

Northumberland

Durham

Yorkshire

Second.

Lincolnshire

Nottinghamshire

Leicestershire

Rutlandshire

Norfolk

Suffolk

Cambridgeshire

Huntingdonshire

Northamptonshire

Third:

Essex

Middlesex

Hertfordshire

Bedfordshire

Bucks

Kent

Sussex

Surry

Fourth.

Hampshire

Berkshire

Dorsetshire

Wiltshire

Gloucestershire

Fifth.

Devonshire

Cornwall

Somersetshire

Sixth.

Monmouthshire

Glamorganshire

Carmarthenshire

Pembrokeshire

Cardiganshire

Brecknockshire

Merionethshire

Carnarvonshire

Anglesey

Denbighshire

Flintshire

Montgomeryshire

Radnorshire

Seventh.

Cheshire

Lancashire

Cumberland

Westmoreland

Eighth, or Central.

Derbyshire

Staffordshire

Shropshire

Herefordshire

Worcestershire

Warwickshire

Oxfordshire

“To those unreflecting and timid persons who may still imagine a general arming to be *dangerous to government*, it may be advisable to say a few words. What then more decisive can be said than that *Alfred*, when he armed the whole community, thought not so? Nay, by his penetrating mind, it was seen that it is *the universality of arms* which is the very secret for giving a government of *freedom* and *law* undisturbed tranquility and resistless power. All that is wanting to this effect is simplicity of arrangement, and strictness of regulation.

Nor are we left to mere reasoning on this question; for there is no historical fact better established than that in his reign, and owing to the very system of an universal arming, the authority of *law*,

and the energy of the *civil power*, which comprehend the whole of *government*, were carried to a height of perfection never exhibited to the view of mankind in any other age or nation. Let any man compare this with what has so often happened in our own times, and he cannot be at a loss to see to which system, that of an armed inhabitancy, or that of a standing army, a preference is due. Let him look back to the first establishment of turnpikes, or to the first raising the partial modern militia both in *England* and *Scotland*; when insurrectionary proceedings caused the effusion of much blood: Let him call to mind the hundreds of tumults that have disturbed the public tranquillity, particularly in our large towns: Let him take a retrospect of what happened in *St. George's Fields*, in the beginning of the present reign, the infamous conflagrations at *Birmingham*, and the infernal proceedings in the capital in the year 1780, and then let him ask himself, if any one of these events, so alarming and so calamitous to the people, and so disgraceful to government, could possibly have taken place, had the system of the immortal *Alfred* been in use and vigour.

“After the celebrated example of that great king's reign, it cannot be said this is only *supposing* the arms will be employed in *support* of law, in which case the irresistible power of government is

admitted: nor can it with propriety be asked, what would be the consequence, if they should be turned *against* it? I confess I should not know how to answer such a question, better than by asking such another.—What, then, would be the consequence if the waters of the *Thames*, the *Severn*, and the *Humber*, and of all our other rivers, were to turn against their own sources, to climb the hills from whence by the law of nature they descend, and to pour their streams into the country instead of the ocean? Can any one, pretending to reason, imagine a free people, having a legislature in which they were substantially represented, and their community regulated and preserved by a law emanating, through such a medium, *from themselves*,—can any one, I ask, imagine, such a people so circumstanced, capable of uniting the power of their own arms, to destroy their own work, their own prosperity, their own happiness?—Has any man yet dreamed the people of the American States, because really a free and armed people, are therefore likely to use their arms against their own governments; which, so far from having a standing army, have not amongst them a single professional soldier? The supposition is too absurd to stand for a moment.

“But no man can look into history without perceiving that, *wherever mercenary soldiers and standing armies have been introduced, there the*

true government of the state has invariably been subverted, by those who had the command of the armies.

“Look through the annals of the world,” says Lord *Liverpool*, “and see if any one instance of a militia can be produced, that was seditious of itself; or of a people who, when the sword was put into their hands, converted it to their own destruction. Free states have almost always been subject to commotions, and the same have generally been defended by a militia; but that the military establishment of such a people were the cause of their commotions can never be proved;—the republic of *Carthage* is a singular instance of a free people that owed their defence to mercenary soldiers; and yet she was nevertheless fertile in dissensions;—and though *Rome* had as many soldiers as citizens, though her senators and plebeians had frequent contests for power, where the balance was unequally adjusted, yet her people when in their greatest fury, and when driven by injustice almost to despair, never once had recourse to arms: they urged their claims by supplications and secessions; and, though disciplined and ready at all times to take up arms in defence of their country, they never lifted up a hand against it: for several centuries not a life was lost in all their contentions; and it was not until *the nature of their armies was changed, until*

“ their legions *received pay*, were transported into
 “ *distant provinces*, and never suffered to return to
 “ their *domestic occupations* ; in a word, not
 “ until the honest militia men of *Rome* were chang-
 “ ed into *standing forces*, that their contests blazed
 “ out into civil wars destructive to the common-
 “ wealth *.”

By a system of *defence on right principles*, we should not only reduce the expense of our army but of our navy also ; which, by a large increase of pay, and many indulgences unknown when I was upon service, is become much more expensive than formerly ; for, so far as the defence of *Great Britain* should be in question, we need scarcely detain a ship from services of real utility ; and, consequently, if our ships are now properly denominated our *wooden walls*, a very great expense might be saved, or many more ships might be employed to guard *Ireland*. Let us put a case. I will suppose an attempt at invasion in the county where I live, and that the enemy's force collected in the ports of *Holland* may choose their time for coming over. They shall have fifty thousand men ; of which five thousand shall be cavalry, and a plentiful train of artillery. I will suppose our first intelligence the sight of their approaching fleet. Signals give the alarm, and our whole military sub-division is instantly in motion.

* Lord Hawkesbury's Discourse, p. 49.

It will be remembered that it has four parks of artillery at its military stations ; which I should suppose might be advantageously fixed as follows ; namely, one at the midway point on the high road between *Grinsby* and *Louth*, or nearly so ; one, at the point where the turnpike road from *Alford* unites with the turnpike road from *Louth* to *Spilsby* ; or nearly so ; one, at *Tattersal*, where there is a bridge across the river *Witham* ; and one, at or near the point where the turnpike road from *Dennington* unites with the turnpike road from *Sleaford* to *Bourne*, which is part of the road from *London* to *Barton*, through *Lincoln* : Each of these parks I suppose to be provided with thirty pieces of flying artillery. By consulting the recent returns of population, I perceive the *sub-division* cannot contain so few as 60,000 fighting men ; that the other sub-divisions of the district must contain 60,000 more, total 120,000 ; and that the central district abutting upon the interior boundary of these two sub-divisions, being much more populous, could, even after providing a succour of 20,000 men for the S. W. district, as formerly proposed, furnish at once 70,000, to be added to the former 120,000, besides holding back a reserve of 70,000 men, for succouring, if necessary, any other part of the coast that might be attacked. Here, then, for encountering 50,000 invaders, we have, exclusive of pioneers, and men at-

tached to the cannon, carriages, &c. &c. a total of 190,000 men completely armed; of whom 6200 would be cavalry; and the total of their artillery would amount to 300 pieces of cannon.

When I consider the magnitude of the supposed enemy's equipment, the arranging of their ships, the disposition for the debarkation, the landing of their artillery, and ammunition, camp equipage, stores, and provisions, these may well be supposed to take up more time than the assembling of 60,000 men, to oppose them in front, and the bringing up at least ninety pieces of cannon. Meanwhile, the horses and draught oxen being driven off, but no other *driving of the country* depriving us of a single peasant, or confusing our operations, the progress of the enemy, so opposed, as I have said, must necessarily be very slow. But we will not, for a while, oppose him too obstinately; we will only, availing ourselves of our superior knowledge of the country, gall him at every step; constantly engaging, but still retreating from hedge to hedge, and bank to bank, breaking up the roads by which his artillery and carriages must pass, and compelling him to fight for every inch of ground. Thus obstructed, how many miles a day can he advance?

After incessant marching, and incessant fighting, for three days, his numbers every hour diminishing, ours every hour encreasing, and having been har-

passed with alarms at least of his camp being stormed each night, and perhaps real attacks, we will suppose him advanced fifteen miles into the country: I had rather it was thirty; and therefore it shall be so admitted. By the fourth morning, if not sooner, he must find upon each of his flanks a new army much greater than his own, and of fresh troops; and corps, likewise, penetrating on each side into his rear; and the army in his front now also double its original number.

It must be unnecessary to carry our suppositions any farther: and the truth is that, let but our preparedness for war be only such as it must be, if both government and people do not shamefully desert those duties which all ought to know, and do not abandon to its overthrow a constitution which all ought to support, no invasion of our country at all would ever be dreamed of; for, were we duly prepared, no enemy, in his senses, could expect even to make good a landing without losing half his force, nor to penetrate a single day's march without a total surrender, like that of our own army at *Ostend*, after passing but a single night on the sea-beach.

This was an army of *fifteen hundred* men, who had been tempted to hazard a landing when they could not retreat on account of the weather, in consequence of their intelligence that the enemy had *only a small force at Ostend, Newport, and Bruges*; but at day break the next morning they found them-

selves surrounded, as Captain *Popham*, in his letter, expresses it, "by several thousands of the *national* troops."

In *Ireland*, on the contrary, where defence depended on a *standing army*, and where Lord *Cornwallis* had *twenty thousand* troops on foot, *nine hundred Frenchmen* landed at *Killala*, gained advantages over the army of General *Lake*, lost *eight days* in waiting to be joined by the *Irish*, then advanced, "drove the country, and carried with them "all the horses *," and penetrated to the heart of the kingdom before they were overpowered.

It will be observed that, in this drama of an invasion, I have not consigned to the flames the cornstacks of the farmer, nor driven his flocks and his herds into the interior; but merely contented myself with simply removing out of the way of the enemy, as his resources, *horses and draught oxen*. This is no oversight; for as I am certain of subduing that enemy I see no necessity of committing any such waste and destruction, but the contrary; for when we shall push an army into his *rear*, we shall ourselves want the cattle and grain for our subsistence; and I should think the pike or spear-armed peasantry much better employed, as *pioneers and drivers of cannon*, than as *desolaters and drivers of cattle*. On this part of my subject something more remains to be said hereafter.

* General Lake's Letter.

I have, indeed, here supposed only one invasion; whereas we might be invaded at two, or three, or four points at the same time. But if I have supposed only *one* attack, it will be remembered that it was with a large army, and yet that I put in motion for the defence only *one* maritime military district; leaving all the rest in *perfect tranquillity*, and without diminishing their own means of a similar defence, by drawing away from them a single man. Let us then suppose that, instead of one invasion, we have four; and, if you please, on the same day; two of the hostile armies containing 50,000 men each; and the other two 25,000 each; beyond which, it is imagined, no man will carry his ideas of probability, until another *Paul of Muscovy* may unite with *France*, and carry into the confederacy *Denmark* and *Sweden*. Now having, as it will be recollected, left in the central district 70,000 men, and 60 pieces of cannon, each of our two maritime districts, that is attacked by an enemy 50,000 strong, has the same means of defence as I have already described; and the other two, respectively attacked by only half the force, have means of resistance still greater in proportion, and more concentrated.

Here, then, although your whole navy were guarding *Ireland*, or otherwise wholly out of the question, and you had in one and the same day four such invasions on any four points of the coast at

the option of the enemy, the inhabitants of the three individual districts not attacked might, in fact, be following the plough or their other occupations in perfect tranquillity, and without any necessity of sending succours beyond their own limits, within which there would remain 360,000 fighting men. I would have it likewise noticed by the reader that, although I begin with *defensive* fighting, mine is not a *Fabian* system, so much celebrated by historians, but which, God forbid, should ever be practised in this country ! When *Hannibal* invaded the *Romans*, he maintained himself in their territory *fifteen years* : But when *Bonaparte* shall invade the *English*, if he be not sick of his enterprise in *fifteen hours*, and have not surrendered in one third part of *fifteen days*, those who are responsible for the defence ought to lose their heads.

*EXPOSTULATION with the AUTHORS of
the STATUTES, commonly called the GE-
NERAL DEFENCE ACTS.*

IT must have been noticed, by all observers of what passes in parliament, that our most eminent statesmen, while discussing the means of security, all directed their thoughts more or less to the constitutional mode of defence, by *posse comitatus*, and all seemed to speak as if it had been taken as a guide to their judgment. I particularly allude to Lord Grenville, Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Windham; Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Yorke, (then Secretary at War, but now Secretary of State) and the presiding Minister. If, therefore, the statutes for arming the people have not come from their hands so perfect as might have been wished, perhaps we ought, in candour, to make for them the same apology as Sir William Jones, no unlearned constitutional lawyer, and one who had not then at his shoulders the burthen of a public office, appears to have made for himself, when he wrote his admirable *Inquiry into the legal means of suppressing riots, with a constitutional plan of future defence*; in which he carefully treats the subject of the *posse*,

comitatus; and as he more particularly proceeded therein to make for gentlemen in general.

“ It is,” says he, “ in every one’s mouth, that, on all violent breaches of the peace, the sheriff of the county is not only authorised but commanded to raise the *posse comitatus*, and forcibly to suppress the tumult: but, if most of those who use this expression will examine their own minds, they will presently perceive that they utter words which convey to them *no distinct idea*, and that the *power of the county*, like many other powers in nature and jurisprudence, is very ill ascertained, and very imperfectly comprehended.” (p. 11.)

In observing upon the system of defence adopted by ministers, let us be as much disposed to give them praise, for what they have done well, as to question the fitness of those parts of their work of which we cannot approve: but, putting personal praise or dispraise out of the question, let us look impartially at the plan itself; let us try it by the test of the constitution; let us try it on military principles; and let us try it by the rules of plain reasoning; for *plans of defence, on which all men are to act, all men ought to understand.*

On what I may think defects in this plan I mean to touch very lightly; but it were greatly to be wished the authors of it would scrutinize it, with a sincere desire to free it from whatever may be unconstitutional, unmilitary, or ill calculated for *combin-*

ing, in one convenient, simple, energetic plan of resistance, those who dwell on the coast with those who inhabit the interior.

I have already shewn how the CONSTITUTION wisely provides for that *combining* of the external with the internal parts of the community, on a plan which all can understand, and upon which all, for that reason, can act without confusion or disorder; and, as nearly as may be, without the possibility of an erroneous movement. A plan, *by means of which, every particle of national force might, on one uniform, simple, all-embracing system, with ease be brought into action, with the utmost celerity, and the most perfect order*, must inspire into all hearts a confidence which cannot be inspired by any other system.

But, let us recommend to the authors of the new system a thorough investigation of it, arranging their observations as follows: namely,

- 1st. On the proposed continuance of the *military* service of the *civil* state :
- 2d. On volunteer and optional services :
- 3d. On the conditions of acceptance :
- 4th. On the mode of arming :
- 5th. On the classes :
- 6th. On the liability of persons in the *civil* state to be impressed and draughted into the ranks of the mercenary troops, and subjected to the articles of war :

7th. On the discretionary and suspending powers conferred by the statutes :

8th. On the express provisions for desolating our own country every where in front of an advancing enemy ; and

9th. On the security given our country of not being made **THE SEAT OF WAR.**

First, then, seeing that under the statute (43. Geo. III. c. 96) the "military services" of the volunteers and all others enrolled are only to have continuance "*during the present war*," let it be considered how this corresponds with the *constitution*, with a necessary economy in our future military establishment—and with national severity either in war or *peace*, while *France* shall remain a gigantic military despotism, grasping at universal dominion with a keener appetite, and a far broader basis, than ancient *Rome*. When on these several points we shall have acquired "*distinct ideas*," it will be seen, I presume, that, instead of a mere temporary substitute for **THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION**, it ought to be "**RESTORED TO FULL VIGOUR AND ENERGY**," to give permanent security for the peace and *the existence* of the state.

Secondly, touching volunteer and optional services, although the question is open to other remarks, the author will now do little more than repeat a few words which the act of the late war, now

for the most part copied by 34 Geo. III. c. 55, formerly drew from him:

“This, at first sight, may appear conciliating; but it is calculated to make wrong impressions, and to perpetuate the present great **IGNORANCE** of the English constitution; which is, unquestionably, one of the greatest **OF ALL OUR NATIONAL MISFORTUNES**. That constitution—a constitution of liberty and beneficence—knowing it to be *equally the duty of every man* to defend the laws and liberties of his country, and the peace, property, and happiness of the community of which he is a member—confidently; justly, honourably, and wisely **PRESUMES** every man a volunteer in such a cause; and consequently it dictates only an organization of the collective force, the means of rendering it effective, and the regulations under which it shall be exerted. To ask, therefore, each individual, if he be a volunteer or not in the service now proposed, is at least to cause a doubt in his mind, whether it be his constitutional duty or not; or rather, it insinuates that no such duty exists prior to an invitation on the part of the crown. Hence, the question seems to be either distrustful, ensnaring, embarrassing, or inconvenient; and the act, in this respect, does not appear to be consistent either with the constitution or with the leading words of its own preamble.”

It is not to perform a common and universal duty, which none can refuse without legal penalties or

moral infamy, that we beat up for *volunteers*; but when we propose to men to do that which is *not* a duty, or *more* than a duty. In respect of *defence*, it is *after* the enrolment of all able-bodied men that we come to the objects of *volunteering*. If peculiar services will expose men to more than common expense, or fatigue, or danger, volunteering is then meritorious, and here is its proper sphere.

Thirdly, touching conditions of acceptance, we find that no volunteer services can be accepted, unless the offer extend "to ~~march to any part of Great Britain;~~" and not solely, in the case of "invasion," but in that of "insurrection" also. From this condition, as well as from the fact of *suspension* relative to the power of calling out the population of the country in arms, we are unavoidably led to conjecture that no settled regular plan of defence can have existence; but that it must depend upon the circumstances of the occasion, and upon the talents of the commanding general.

Under a complete revival of THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION, every man could easily calculate the extent to which he would be liable to march from his home and his domestic affairs, and the time for which his services could be required; and, as before observed, he would be acting upon a plan by which he must be inspired with the utmost confidence of a successful, and very speedy, termination of his exertions. A close comparison

of the two systems in these respects is earnestly recommended to his Majesty's ministers.

Fourthly, as to the *mode* of arming; being for the most part by arms issued by government, and which, at the expiration of the war, are to be recalled, ministers will here again, by consulting the constitution, see cause for an amendment of their system. The reader has seen how *Englishmen* were armed in ancient times, even under princes of the *Norman* line; and those again of the house of *Tudor*. None of those princes were much distinguished for their tenderness towards national liberty; and yet, in those times, an *Englishman's* arms were to be *his own*, and kept in *his own house*: *two times a year* he was to be sworn to the possession and the property; nay, when all other goods and moveables were seizable for debt, his "*horse and harness*," as a member of the *posse comitatus*, were *sacred even from the touch of the sheriff, although armed with the king's writ*.*

Let the ministers, then, of a king of the house of *Brunswick*, whose glory it is that that house was called to the throne of these kingdoms as the guardian of freedom and the constitution, take especial care that none of their measures shall derogate from the reputation of the prince they serve; nor from the high character of the nation they now call upon to assert

* See 13 Ed. I. St. 1. c. 39.

its own rights, to maintain its own dignity, and to preserve its own liberties !

Fifthly, touching the classing of those who are liable to bear arms ; perhaps, upon an amendment of the new system, it might be adviseable to avoid the present complexity. In the formation of corps out of the general mass, those *indiscriminately* of most vigour and activity should be selected for grenadiers, light infantry, and riflemen ; those next in prowess, for the general column ; while the striplings, and those of declining years, would of course form the reserve. Such is the simplicity of nature.

In the present system there is, indeed, an amiable feature, in putting forward those who are unmarried and are without children, as the first to face danger ; but it has been the policy of wise nations, rather to rely upon the arms of those whose personal interests were more interwoven with those of the state ; through the medium of the tender connections arising out of connubial life ; and, when *the whole* of the two systems now brought in comparison shall be taken into contemplation, there seems to be little doubt but that a right judgment will be formed.

Sixthly, respecting the liability of persons in the civil state to be impressed and draughted into the ranks of the mercenary troops, subjected to the articles of war ; and liable to be marched, as Mr. *Sheridan* expresses it, " to *Cornwal* or to *Scotland*," it seems better for the most part to address

privately to ministers the observations that occur on this topic than to make them, at this time, part of a public discussion. On the present occasion, therefore, the author will only request his reader to consider whether, on a system of *defence on right principles*, that is, on a restoration of THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION TO FULL VIGOUR AND ENERGY, any thing so uncongenial with the feelings of an *Englishman* could, under any possible circumstances, become *necessary*.

Seventhly, in respect to the discretionary and suspending powers, conferred by the statutes; here, again, is very serious matter for the re-consideration of those by whom those statutes were framed.

When the law of self-preservation, which is the first law of nature, when the common law, and when the constitution of *England*, all enforce the duty of common arms-bearing for common defence; when every man is liable to be called on by the magistrate, at all times, and at a moment's warning, to suppress *armed insurrection*, to put down *open rebellion*, or to repel *the invading enemies* of our country, and is exposed to the pains of law for disobedience; and when we have experienced the most vindictive threats of invasion, and of the very extinction of our state, by a nation of the greatest military power that has appeared since the time of the uni-

versal dominion of the *Romans* ; how are we to account for what we see ?

Possessed of a *permanent* but *neglected* military system, which, on the true principles of order—the very bond of society—by a beautiful, refined, yet simple mechanism, organizes a community of free citizens into an invincible army ; which communicates the sensibilities of the individual to the aggregate of society ; and which causes those energies, for resenting menace and repelling assault, that characterize a brave man, to adorn and dignify a great nation ;—a system which, in short, holds over every other military system of human invention, a glorious pre-eminence ; why do we not see it *restored to full vigour and energy*, instead of the introduction of a *temporary* and a *discretionary* substitute without its most essential attributes ?

When the nation is called on by ministers, in little pamphlets circulated beyond all example, on every consideration that can influence the human mind, to stand forward as one man in defence of our country, why do we see them any where damping the spirit they themselves have raised, by the rejection of services, by the slowness in providing arms, and, above all, by a suspension of the far greater part of the powers of their own act for general defence ?

Surely, while the pressure of necessity is upon us, and while the national pulse beats high in favour of constitutional energy, they will seize the happy moment for completing our system of defence, to which we are invited by so many considerations relative to economy, tranquillity, security, freedom, and happiness !

Eighthly, touching the parliamentary provisions for completely desolating our own country every where in front of an advancing enemy ; we must not too readily censure ministers for their adoption, because they stand on high military authority. The successful execution of this measure by *Francis I.* when invaded by *Charles V.* and whereby he saved his kingdom, being perhaps the most celebrated in history, it is no more than reasonable to suppose it is the example which all subsequent generals and war ministers have had in their eye ; but the example is so horrible as to put us rather on considering how the practice is to be avoided, if possible, than how it is to be carried into execution.

“ On the occasion before us, one of the most happy provinces of France, about an hundred miles long and fifty wide, of an extent equal to the three counties of *Kent*, *Sussex*, and *Surry* united, was, as a mere measure of precaution, reduced to an uninhabited and frightful desert. Two only of the cities being fortified, “ the

“ inhabitants of the other towns, as well as of the
 “ open country, were compelled to abandon their
 “ houses, and were conducted to the mountains, to
 “ the camp at *Avignon*, or the inland provinces.
 “ Corn, forage, and provisions of every kind, were
 “ carried away or destroyed; all the mills and ovens
 “ were ruined, and the wells filled up or rendered
 “ useless. The devastation continued from the *Alps*
 “ to *Marseilles*, and from the sea to the confines
 “ of *Dauphiné*; nor does history afford any in-
 “ stance, among civilized nations, in which this
 “ cruel expedient for the public safety was employed
 “ with the same rigour. The execution of this
 “ plan *Francis* committed entirely to *Montmorency*,
 “ who was the author of it; a man wonderfully
 “ fitted by nature for such a trust; haughty, se-
 “ vere, confident in his own abilities, and despising
 “ those of other men; incapable of being diverted
 “ from any resolution by remonstrances or en-
 “ treaties; and in prosecuting any scheme regard-
 “ less alike of love or pity*.”

“ Good God! if such be the *prudence* of war—
 if such are to be its effects, wrought upon our own
 country by our own hands, dreadful indeed must be
 this scourge of the human species!—Here is the
 picture of a country extending as far as from *Dover*

* *Essay on Defensive War*, 32.

to *Chichester*, and from the south coast to *London*; which presented even to its ruthless invader a face of so much desolation as to strike him with horror, and chill his soul!

“ And when this policy is an acknowledged part of the science of modern war, in which all the learned in that science seem to be agreed; to us, who inhabit an island accessible (on any other than the constitutional system of defence) on all sides, it becomes a question truly interesting, whether such a desolation of our borders on the approach of an enemy be really necessary. If attacked at once on the east the west and the south coast, to carry this desolation to the extent it was carried in the instance before us, our whole island must be destroyed; for, by the powers of the statute, 43 Geo. III. c. 55, the country is to be made a desert wherever the enemy may be *advancing*, so that this spoil and desolation may easily reach the heart of the kingdom, and extend in all directions. And incalculable even would be the destruction and the calamities, supposing this desolation to extend only twelve miles from the coast; as seemed to be in the contemplation of government, when the sheriffs were lately directed to make a return of the stock within those limits.”

“ But I ask the statesman and the soldier, if, on the true principles of military defence, *any* such de-

solation be necessary? If he have not yet from the perusal of these pages made the discovery, I will tell him:—This monstrous policy is a fundamental error in the science of war, originating in *a violation of the fundamental principles of civil government*. It is in the practice of war its science is formed; and all the modern kings and generals by whom it has successively been cultivated, and brought to its present degree of perfection, have contented themselves with adapting their military rules to *that state or condition of society which fell under their experience and observation*. Seeing every where that monopoly of arms which forms *standing armies*, and the bulk of every nation consequently *disarmed*, from this wretched condition of society, experience uniformly proved the practability of penetrating into any country even with an army inferior to its own; and for a while at least being master of a portion of it. It was this danger, a danger certainly threatening a complete conquest, especially if the invader happened to be superior in strength or generalship, that dictated this celebrated expedient, and ingrafted it into the science of modern war.

“ But let any man, instead of the miserable system of defence by a standing army, only contemplate the noble and irresistible system of the great *Alfred*, and he must instantly see that so dreadful an infliction of calamity on ourselves never can be in the

smallest degree necessary; but that provision of every kind may be left in its place, without enabling an enemy to advance one step the more into the country; and consequently that no other removals would become a matter of prudence, than merely a removal of the horses and draught oxen, the infirm and helpless part of the community, and of money or other valuables lying within so narrow a compass as to be objects of pilfering or pillage.

“ Herein then our system has a new recommendation of the greatest magnitude and importance. Let any man only calculate the destruction of the property lying in any county within twelve miles only of the coast; let him imagine the confusion and the countless miseries of depopulating such a border; the permanent ill effects in the poverty it must occasion; the years it would require to restore to the country the same face of cultivation and plenty; and the burthen upon the public purse to make even some compensation to the sufferers (for a complete compensation is out of the question); and he will shudder at the idea of such a cruel sacrifice being necessary to our safety, as often as *France* may find means to make a descent upon our coast. And there is yet another consideration. If, instead of the complete security and enjoyment afforded to the people by the constitutional system of defence, they should experience the devastation of the other system, the degree of discon-

tent and alienation of heart from the common cause, which it might occasion, ought seriously to be taken into the account.

The returns lately made from my own township having led me to a consideration of the effects of the present erroneous system, in case an enemy should approach the coast of the county in which I live, I have endeavoured to state it in such a form as to convey some idea of the inconveniencies to be foreseen.

“ The bending shores of *Lincolnshire* being an hundred miles in length, there are consequently contained within twelve miles of the coast 768,000 acres of land. From these deducting an eighth part, for roads, drains and actual wastes, there remains a clear total of 672,000 acres of cultivated land. Considering then that this tract of land contains all the fine sea marshes, and much other rich pasture land, as well as the richest of the tillage land, formerly fen, the stock about harvest time, which is a season particularly attended to by invaders, cannot be estimated at less on an average than six pounds per acre, allowing for fallows; which makes a total value in mere provisions of flesh and grain of above four millions of pounds sterling. And here we are to remember we are calculating only to a breadth of twelve miles; a space over which an unobstructed army would march in three hours: In the instance

we have taken from history, it reached *fifty* miles in-land. Now it is pretty evident that, in case of driving the country, the greater part of the stock must be *destroyed*; for, if it take up every farmer two or three weeks to lead his hay and corn from his own field to his own yard, how is it possible to convey it *on a sudden* many miles on the appearance of an enemy? and no general will think of the cruel expedient of *driving* until the moment of imminent danger. Even cattle and sheep must in a very great degree be destroyed; for where are the immense herds and flocks from the sea-coast marshes and pastures to find food, if driven into the interior, where every man has already as much stock as his land can support?

If there be eloquence in the affecting sentiment of true patriotism, or in that of general humanity; or if tenderness for kindred, for parents, for children, or for the objects of our warmest affection can touch the heart, then, in the contemplation of a plan of which the *driving* system is a feature, there are arguments for the system of defence recommended in these pages, which no *English* bosom can resist. Instead of *calculations* on the proportion of such a *national scourge* which shall be endured, while troops to face an invader shall be collecting from the distant parts of the kingdom, subject to all the diversions that might be occasioned by collateral at-

tacks, give *Englishmen* their proper constitutional defence, and then you shall see them meet an invading enemy with a confident smile, and with this salutation,—*Behold our wealth, and touch it at your peril!*—Instead of the driving of your maritime borders, spreading dismay and consternation through your own interior, by obscuring the sun with clouds of dust ascending from innumerable herds and flocks, and filling the air with the hurrying yells of the herdsmen and shepherds, mingling with the piercing cries and wailings of women and children, flying in terror and confusion before the face of *French* ravagers; instead, I say, of thus disgracefully driving the country, stand to your arms, preserve your property, defend your females, and drive the *Frenchmen* into the sea!

Instead of a panic-spreading movement from your border to your interior, substitute the fear-dispelling torrent of a real *posse comitatus* pouring down in a contrary direction, filling highways and bye-ways with column after column in endless succession! Instead of the piteous cries of children, and the wailings of terrified women, let the shouts of the brave, seeking the battle, be heard from afar! Instead of the discordant yells of cattle-drivers, and the yelping of shepherds' curs, let the air resound with patriotic songs and martial music; sights and sounds appalling the stoutest-hearted invader!

These ideas having produced the following song,
it is given to the reader :

THE CIVIC WARRIORS;

OR

THE COUNTY POWER OF ENGLAND.



I.

NIGHT yields the empire of the air ;

Aurora beams ; the wind sits fair ;

What see'st thou, Watchman, from thy tow'r ?

A countless forest seems to rise—

On wings of war, it thisward flies :

'Tis glory's call, brave patriot *Power* !

Your right hands, all, O, raise on high,

Swear to live free, or, fighting die !

2.

To arms ! to arms ! the chiefs command ;

Arrayed the ready warriors stand,

Impatient for the victor's crown :

Wave, banner wave ! speak, ratt'ling drum !

With rapid step, we come, we come,

In life, or death, to gain renown !

Your right hands, all, O, raise on high ;
Swear to live free, or, fighting, die !

3.

Hark ! hark ! invaders' cannon roar ;
See ! see ! their legions reach the shore ;
As rav'ning tygers, fierce and fell ;
But lo ! upon the tyger foe
Thy lions rush, and lay them low,
Nor one returns the tale to tell.

Your right hands, all, O, raise on high ;
Swear to live free, or, fighting, die !

4.

Now, parent, infant, maiden, wife,
All flock around, in tender strife,
Who first shall kiss a victor's hand ;
Who first shall deck a victor's brow,
With sweetest native flow'rs that grow
On Freedom's high-fam'd happy land.

Your right hands, all, O, raise on high ;
Swear to live free, or, fighting, die !

Ninthly, and lastly ; we arrive at this very serious question—What is the security given our country, of not being made the seat of war ?

The following Stanza is to be read as the *third* of the foregoing song, p. 112.

A king, who feels the common cause,
 And fights for liberty and laws,
 To battle leads ; on, on, ye brave !
 With warlike shouts the welkin rend ;
 Your homes, your babes, your fair defend ;
 Their charms from foul dishonour save.
 Your right hands, all, O raise, on high ;
 Swear to live free, or, fighting, die !

As patriotic songs can produce little effect unless, by the enchanting sweetness and the animating strains of music, they captivate the public taste, and touch the springs of national enthusiasm, the publisher will be immediately authorised to advertise a prize to be given by the author, of a sword of twenty guineas value, for the best musical composition to which the foregoing song may be set for the voice as a popular ballad.



To clasp a helmet on the head, and a corselet o'er the breast, does not secure invulnerability. *Thetis* omitted to defend only the *heel of Achilles*, and there he received the wound of which he perished. With all due deference to military science and skill, our constitution has wisely ordained that our dependence shall be on the *physical strength of our population*. When we speak of a contest of military genius, we admit the possibility of any disaster. Supposing the superiority of generalship on our own side, yet a general may be killed, or taken sick; or mere accident; in various other shapes, may frustrate the best concerted plan depending on tactics, or military talents. Not so, when we "*organize a community of free citizens into an invincible army.*"

Here, being matter for the minds of our statesmen and legislators to work upon, I shall drop the subject, in hopes it may induce them to revise their plan of defence, which has in it this merit, and that is not a small one, that it has thoroughly prepared the minds of the community for a complete restoration to *full vigour and energy, of the military branch of the Constitution*, and even made no small progress in the execution of that important work.

*The OPINIONS of STATESMEN, HISTORIANS, and PHILOSOPHERS, on
STANDING ARMIES.*

A DUE consideration of that part of our military establishment, which consists of a *standing army*, being an essential part of the task which the author has undertaken, and absolutely necessary towards forming an enlightened judgment on the grand question—*How are we to form a system of defence on right principles?*—We must now that way direct our attention.

It is not in ordinary circumstances that the unreflecting discern the intrinsic merits of a constitution of government; neither is it under considerable difficulties, or considerable dangers merely, that they truly appreciate such an institution; but it is when *the case comes to be extreme* that truth flashes on the mind, and they discover those latent excellencies which they before overlooked. It is the very same in morals and religion, as every day testifies: instead of a conduct strictly right, men satisfy themselves with plausible *substitutes*: instead of the constant practice of

genuine virtue, they fall into the *habits* of open *vice*, or of *spurious* morality ; nor is it until their reputations are on the point of being for ever blasted, that they become convinced that *honesty is the best policy*, or feel themselves struck with other simple truths ; nay, indeed, it is every day's observation that those precepts of religion, which are so plain that he who runs may read, are yet constantly neglected, and in fact unknown, until they become *death-bed discoveries*. It is even thus, by the long use of a sorry *substitute* for constitutional security, by a *spurious* and *pernicious* system of defence and by a settled *habit* of deviation into a *vicious* practice, that our political salvation is at this moment a matter of anxious solicitude. Availing as a death-bed repentance may possibly be to the individual sinner, a STATE that trifles with its fate to the last extremity is still more foolish than the thoughtless profligate ; for, to a STATE, a *death-bed* repentance assuredly comes too late.

In what I shall say of standing armies, I certainly shall not utter a syllable with intent to give offence, either to the present army or to the present rulers of our country. The army did not form itself ; neither was it the creation of our present sovereign, or of his ministers. They found it part of the machinery of government, and they continued to use it as such. Nor was it until very lately our situation was

seen to be that *extreme case*, which was calculated to awaken our rulers to a sense of the right principles of defence, or to the peril of acting upon wrong ones. They are already partly awakened: they have already, on a *temporary* plan, armed a number of free citizens considerably exceeding the number of the standing army. They are going on with the work: seeing the progress they have made, let us give them credit for right intentions, at the same time that we offer them our best aid towards perfecting the system, and saving the state.

At the awful hour of approaching dissolution, the sick man must steadily look his sins in the face, if he would discard them; and the assisting pastor would ill perform his duty, should he attempt to prevent the dying man having a right sense of his moral situation, by disguises, or palliations, or silence, on habitual and notorious breaches of the moral law. In like manner, the political adviser and consoler of his country must be highly deficient in fidelity were he not, in her extremity, to point out her past errors, and to urge upon her attention, how unwelcome soever they may be, those truths, *without which she cannot be saved*.

As in this duty the author wishes to stand as clear as possible of *personally* playing the censor, he will chiefly lay before his reader the sentiments of great and wise, and venerable men; statesmen, historians,

and philosophers; men who have highly adorned, not only our own country, but, the great republic of letters; whose opinions will have infinitely more weight than any thing he could offer on the subject.

He will begin with a panegyric on the army, delivered by the greatest of modern Englishmen, the *first* WILLIAM PITT.

“Formerly,” says his elegant historian, “he had distinguished himself by his opposition to a standing army; and, in pursuance of this principle, had espoused every restriction that had been proposed upon the despotism of military law. Now he pleaded for an extension of that law; and opposed a bill, whose object was to have created such a rotation in the army that, in a few years, every peasant and artisan in the kingdom would have understood the business of a soldier; and the people in general have probably concluded that a standing army was altogether useless.” “Our liberties existed,” he declared, “solely in the dependence upon the DISCRETION of the Sovereign, and the VIRTUE of the army. To that VIRTUE,” said he, “we must trust, even at this hour, small as our army is. To that VIRTUE we must continue to trust, should we espouse all the precautions our warmest opposers can desire. And without this VIRTUE, should the Lords, the Commons, and the People of *England*, intrench themselves behind

“ *parchments up to the teeth, the sword will find a passage to the vitals of the Constitution* *.

Here, then, delivered by the most splendid genius of our age, is the panegyric of a *standing army* ; a panegyric at which every lover of his country, while he reads, must tremble ! But the law of nature, which has impressed it on the heart of every one who has not degenerated from the character of a MAN, that political liberty and *arms of defence* are his right ; and the deep wisdom of *Alfred*, who taught the happy organization by which a whole nation, as one man, may ever stand prepared for and armed against all danger, have left us in a *substantial representation* and an *armed inhabitancy*, a better security, methinks, for our liberties and our possessions, than either the DISCRETION of a sovereign, the VIRTUE of a standing army, or the PARCHMENTS of a standing parliament. It completes the picture of a standing army to say that, in a military view, it exhibits exactly what, in a political view, we see in the borough faction—the concentration of the power of a nation in the hands of a few ; a power which never can be otherwise than dangerous in the extreme ; nor, indeed, other than an actual despotism, while monopolized.

It is this concentration of *legislative power*, at the

* Life of Lord Chatham, p. 43.

disposal of a minister, which both tempts and enables him to cripple liberty by unconstitutional law; and it is this concentration of *military* power which also tempts and enables him to complete its destruction by the sword; and, when once a legislative foundation for despotism is laid, we always find the greatest impatience for finishing the work. Standing armies are not, as some may imagine; only resorted to when the very existence of a state demands it; but, in every government where they have taken root, will in due time be employed on the most ordinary occasions.— King *Charles II.*'s standing army was employed, in the west of *Scotland*, in aid of Episcopacy; where *Burnet*, speaking of the zealous presbyterian ministers, who had been commanded by proclamation “to give over all farther preaching, or serving the cure, and to withdraw from their parishes immediately,” says, “And the military men that lay in the country were ordered to *pull them out of their pulpits, if they should presume to go on in their functions.*”

By regular gradations, discontents were worked up into a spirit of rebellion, which was crushed by General *Dalziel* at Pentland Hill: This, of course, produced new severities; when, by the influence of *Archbishop Sharp*, the civil government put one *Maccaul* to the torture. “He bore the torture with great constancy; and, either he could say nothing, or he had the firmness not to discover those who

“ trusted him. Every man of them could have
 “ saved his own life, if he would accuse any other :
 “ But they were all true to their friends ; *Muccail*,
 “ for all the pains of the torture, died in a rapture of
 “ joy *.”

The forces were now ordered to lie in the west,
 the principal theatre of discontent, “ where Dalziel
 “ acted the Muscovite too grossly †. He threatened
 “ to spit men and to roast them ; and he killed some
 “ in cold blood, or rather in hot blood, for he was
 “ then drunk, when he ordered one to be hanged, be-
 “ cause he would not tell where his father was, for
 “ whom he was in search. . . . When he heard of
 “ any that *did not go to church*, he did not trouble
 “ himself to set a fine upon him, but he set as many
 “ soldiers upon him as should eat him up in a night.
 “ By these means all people were struck with such
 “ terror that *they came regularly to church* ; and
 “ the clergy were so delighted with it that they used
 “ to speak of that time as the poets do of the golden
 “ age.” And this is the account given us by an ho-
 nest bishop ‡.”

He afterwards says, “ A severe prosecution of con-
 “ venticles was set on foot, and a great deal of money
 “ was raised by arbitrary fines ; Lord *Athol* made

* History of his own Times, I. 333. † Ibid. 334.

‡ He had been in the service of the Czar.

“ of this, in one week, 19,000*l.* sterling. I did all I
 “ could to moderate this fury. Duke *Lauderdale*
 “ broke out into the most frantic fits possible. When
 “ I was once saying to him, *Was that a time to*
 “ *drive them into rebellion?* Yes, he said, would to
 “ God they would rebel, that so he might bring over
 “ an army of Irish papists to cut all their throats*.”

Swift, in his letter to *Pope*, 10 Jan. 1721, says,
 “ I had likewise, in those days, a mortal antipathy
 “ to standing armies in times of peace; because I
 “ always took standing armies to be only servants,
 “ hired by the master of the family, for keeping
 “ his own children in slavery; and because I con-
 “ ceived that a prince, who could not think him-
 “ self secure without mercenary troops, must needs
 “ have a separate interest from that of his sub-
 “ jects: although I am not ignorant of those *artifi-*
 “ *cial necessities* which a corrupted ministry can
 “ create, for keeping up forces *to support a faction*
 “ against the public interest.”

Sir *William Temple* tells us, “ standing forces,
 “ or guards in constant pay, were no where used
 “ by lawful princes in their native or hereditary
 “ countries, but only by conquerors in subdued

* History of his own Times, I. 476.

“ provinces, or usurpers at home ; and were a defence only against subjects, not against enemies*.”

It is justly observed, by *Trenchard*, that “ *Harrington* has founded his whole *Oceana* upon a trained militia ;” and that “ *Lord Bacon* in several places bears his testimony against a standing army, and particularly tells us that a mercenary army is fittest to invade a country, but a militia to defend it ; because the first have estates to get, and the latter to protect.”—Again, “ None of which nations (the *Israelites*, *Athenians*, *Corinthians*, *Achaians*, *Lacedemonians*, *Thebans*, *Samnites*, and *Romans*) whilst they kept their liberty, were ever known to maintain any soldiers in constant pay within their cities, or ever suffered any of their subjects to make war their profession ; well knowing that the sword and sovereignty march hand in hand :” and, besides these, he afterwards cites the example of several other nations that were enslaved by their own armies†. Again, “ The first footsteps I find of a standing army in *England*, since the *Romans* left the island, were in *Richard the Second’s* time, who raised four thousand archers in *Cheshire*,

* I. 70. † Tracts by Trenchard and Gordon, I. 10, 25.

“ and suffered them to plunder, live upon free quar-
 “ ter, beat, wound, ravish, and kill wherever they
 “ went; and afterwards he called a parliament,
 “ encompassed them with his archers, forced them
 “ to give up the whole power of parliament, and
 “ make it *treason* * to endeavour to repeal any of
 “ the arbitrary constitutions that were then made.
 “ But being afterwards obliged to go to *Ireland* to
 “ suppress a rebellion there, the people took advan-
 “ tage of it, and dethroned him. The nation had
 “ such a specimen in this reign of a standing army,
 “ that I do not find any king from him to *Charles*
 “ *I.* that attempted keeping up any forces in time
 “ of peace, except the Yeomen of the Guard,
 “ who were constituted by *Henry VII.*—Nor
 “ would they suffer our kings to keep up an army
 “ in *Ireland*, though there were frequent rebel-
 “ lions there, and by that means its subjection was
 “ precarious; *as well knowing they would be in*
 “ *England when called for.*”

* When such reigns as those of *Edward II.* *Richard II.*
 and *Henry VIII.* are alone distinguished in English history
 for the creation of “ wild and new fangled treasons,” as *Black-*
stone calls them, all creators of new treasons must of course
 fall under the suspicion of treading in the steps of such bru-
 tal rulers.

But, says he again, " Thus what our court, for
 " above a thousand years together, had never ef-
 " frontery enough to *ask*, what the *pensioner*
 " *parliament* could not think of without astonish-
 " ment, what King *James's* parliament (that was
 " almost chosen by himself) could not hear debated
 " with patience, we are likely to have the honour
 " of establishing in our own age, even under a
 " *deliverance*." This was written ten years after
 the *Revolution*, in the reign of King *William* ;
 who, in return for a crown, bequeathed to the
 people who gave it him the *standing army* and
 the *funding system*. *Trenchard* proceeds to un-
 fold the policy which accompanies such armies,
 and observes that " an army, kept in *Ireland*, is
 " more dangerous to us than at home : for here, by
 " perpetual converse with their *relations and ac-*
 " *quaintance*, some few of them perhaps may warp
 " towards their country ; whereas, in *Ireland*,
 " they are kept as it were in garrison, where they
 " are shut up from the communication of their
 " countrymen, and may be nursed up in another
 " interest. This is so true, that it is a common
 " policy among arbitrary princes often to shift
 " their soldiers' quarters, lest they should contract
 " friendship among the natives, and by degrees
 " fall into their interest."

And he adds, " If the army should be continued " a *few* years," [It has now been continued an hundred years] " they will be accounted a part of " the prerogative, and it will be thought as great " a violation to attempt the disbanding them, as " the guards in *Charles II.*'s time : It shall be interpreted a design to dethrone the king, and be " made an argument for keeping them up*." We have lived to see *Scotch* soldiers employed to keep the peace in *England*, and *English* soldiers enforcing the execution of the laws in *Scotland*, and plenty of both nations teachers of loyalty to the people of *Ireland* : But we have also witnessed what *Trenchard*, shrewd as he was, had not sagacity enough to prophesy—our country covered with *barracks*, nay an *English militia* constantly kept at a distance from " *their relations and acquaintance*," and even employed in *Scotland* and *Ireland* ! ! !

Again : " Were not the *French* as powerful in " *Charles II.* and King *James's* time as they are " after this long and destructive war [1697], and " a less alliance to oppose them? And yet we " then thought a much less army than is now con-

* Tracts by *Trenchard* and *Gordon*, I. 63, 64, 87, 88, 103.

“ tended for, a most insurmountable grievance ;
“ insomuch that in *Charles the II.*’s reign the *grand*
“ *jury presented them, and the pensioner parlia-*
“ *ment voted them, to be a nuisance : sent Sir*
“ *Jos. IV—son to the Tower for saying the king*
“ *might keep guards for the defence of his person,*
“ and addressed to have them disbanded*.” The
late minister could maintain with impunity that the
king can bring into the country as many foreign
mercenaries as he should think proper.

Trenchard had before said, “ If I must be a slave,
“ it is very indifferent to me who is my master ; and
“ therefore I shall never consent to be ruled by an
“ army, which is the worst that the most barbarous
“ conquest can impose upon me. Nay, in many
“ respects an authorized standing army is far worse
“ than a foreign invasion, and a conquest from
“ abroad ; for there we have a chance for it : But
“ this is a conquest in cold blood, which may not
“ be resisted ; and we lose the inseparable right of
“ the conquered, which is to rescue and deliver
“ themselves, and throw off the yoke as soon as
“ they can†.”

* Tracts by Trenchard and Gordon, I, 26.

† Ibid. I, 29, 40.

Doctor *Gilbert Stuart*, in his *View of Society in Europe, in its progress from rudeness to refinement*, tells us "It was chiefly the enormous dissoluteness and irregularity of manners, introduced by the mercenaries, which deformed England so much in the reign of *Edward I.* that the ordinary judges were thought unable to execute the laws. This, it would seem, made *Edward* invent a new tribunal of justice, which had power to traverse the kingdom, and to inflict discretionary punishments on offenders*. Yet," says he, "a court so inquisitorial was a daring insult to a free nation, and infinitely a greater calamity than all the disorders which prevailed. That country is miserable where the discretion of a judge is the law†."

After repeated mention of the *mercenaries* whom our kings were in the habit of hiring whenever they had money, "the introduction" says he "of these banditti into a feudal army, was the utmost violence to its nature: It offended infinitely the barons, and the military tenants, that they should be called to mingle with persons so igno-

* Spelman Gloss: voc TRAILBASTON.

† How inferior this English Justinian to an Alfred! And how deeply tinged with the despotism of the Norman imperial law!

“ ble. Yet the princes of Europe, finding the
 “ advantages of troops whom they could command
 “ to their purpose, and march at their will, were
 “ disposed to encourage them. They perceived
 “ that they could possess no power * without mer-
 “ cenaries : and no mercenaries were to be had
 “ without money. *Hence* the passion for wealth
 “ they were to discover ; *hence* their ruinous pro-
 “ jects to acquire it.”

“ The mercenaries, which were made neces-
 “ sary by the disorders of the fiefs and chi-
 “ valry, were to lead to misfortunes and misery.”
 (123).—The necessity here spoken of is the
 state necessity of restless savage princes, delight-
 ing in foreign war, and unable to get themselves
 a name, but by mad expeditions to the Holy
 Land, or to France, and by the slaughter of
 their species. But where was the *national* ne-
 cessity, in a military view, of such expeditions ;
 or of any military force not to have been
 found in the *posse comitatus*, preserved in full
 vigour and purity ? Now mark the consequences
 which flowed from our kings imagining merce-
 naries necessary. — “ Mercenaries,” says Mr.
Stuart, “ were scarcely known, when the princes

* He should have said no arbitrary power.

“ of Europe invented the art of extorting the
 “ wealth of their subjects ; and of *employing it to*
 “ *oppress them.* THUS MERCENARIES GAVE
 “ RISE TO TAXATIONS IN EUROPE.”!!! (123)

Admirable premises, for conducting us to the Doctor’s conclusion, that a standing army of many thousand mercenaries is become *necessary* to us !

And Mr. *Stuart* observes that “ the victory of
 “ the kingly authority, over the liberty of the peo-
 “ ple, continued in many princes the power of tax-
 “ ation ; and this power, and the command of mer-
 “ cenaries, are *the completion of despotism.*”

But let us go on : “ Mercenaries,” says Mr. *Stuart*, “ were the strength of armies ; but to col-
 “ lect such multitudes of them as were necessary for
 “ great and vigorous efforts, required an *inexhaus-*
 “ *tible revenue.* They had, besides, no principle of
 “ attachment or honour. An object of terror to the
 “ people, and of suspicion to the prince, they were
 “ employed and detested.”

Charles VII. of *France*, it seems, began the sys-
 tem of standing armies by raising a standing force of
 9000 cavalry and 16000 infantry ; and, according to,
 Mr. *Stuart*, “ succeeding princes were to add to,
 “ and improve upon, the regulation of *Charles* ;—
 “ and from *this period*, the monarchs of *France*
 “ were to be in the full capacity of levying taxes at

“ their pleasure ; and of *surveying, in mockery, the rights and pretensions of their subjects.*”

In the year 1798, before the public had got so much light as at present into the nature of the military force, which is necessary to us, the author commented on the extraordinary performance of Doctor *Stuart*, indirectly recommending that which, on his own reasoning, we ought of all things on earth to reject. He now thinks it unnecessary to repeat what he then said. If such, then, as we have seen them described by so many able men, be the nature and character of mercenary standing armies ; and if the necessities of our situation, both in respect of danger from *France* and the *impossibility of upholding sufficient armies by taxes on the people*, call upon us to “ probe to the bottom,” and to reform our military system, I will say, in the words of Mr. *Addington* (see p. 1.) but without a “ perhaps,” “ It is happy for the future interests of this empire that the occasion now offers, of which we should decisively avail ourselves, to shew that any prospects of attack upon our *finances and independence*, such as the French government seems to entertain, must be vain and futile ;” provided we follow the salutary counsel of Sir *William Jones*, and “ *restore to full vigour and energy*” the military branch of our Constitution.

"It must have been obvious to the reader that a revival of our ancient constitutional militia must supersede the present militia establishment, as well as the standing army; but this could be no cause of regret, because as the least of two evils is always to be preferred, so the most valuable of two good things is equally to be chosen. But in such a change there would be the less to regret, when we consider how much it has been the object of modern policy to assimilate, as much as possible, our militia to the nature, and condition, and character of a standing army. What a true, natural, militia is, I trust, has been made appear; and we have only to ask if our militia, as now actually raised and *hired*, kept up as a standing force, and in pay during a war of many years, subjected to the military articles, and uniformly marched to a distance from its own county, and "their relations and acquaintance," do most resemble such a constitutional force, or a standing army?

"No officer of the present militia, or even of the standing army, will, I trust, take offence at any remarks I have made, on either of those establishments. It is not with the gentlemen connected with those services, but with the establishments themselves, that I alone find fault. Neither am I insensible to the value of the real and important services *England* has received from both those establishments. They have

been many : and while I contemplate the *necessary* ~~all~~ consequences, if establishments formed on wrong principles should continue, and, indeed, *the certain ruin of liberty*, from the continuance of the standing army, I should not render justice to either of those establishments if I bore not my testimony to their past merits, and failed to remark how admirably they have paved the way to a restoration of the ancient system, by the facility we should experience in that restoration, from ~~the~~ diffusion they have given to military knowledge."

REFLECTIONS

IN FAVOUR OF

STATE REFORMATIONS

When they are become necessary.

IF the evils and calamities to be apprehended from half measures were to be inevitable results from *the fortune of war*, we must abide the issues and make the best of them : but, where they may be effectually provided against, and where so to provide is upon a minister as imperious an obligation as it is for the volunteer to do his duty in the ranks, we may hope that the obligation, being once distinctly pointed out, will not fail to produce its effect. This tract will be presented to ministers, with thanks for what they have already well done ; and with lively hopes that the errors of their system will be speedily amended, and what remains to be done will be carried into effect without delay.

It must already have been seen that DEFENCE ON RIGHT PRINCIPLES has in it as much of *civil* as of *military* prudence ; and that, even in its military part, there is less of science than of nature. Its foundation is FREEDOM ; its food, the delicious

fruits of liberty; its life, the passionate attachment of the people to their form of government: it is the very soul of defence that a country be worth defending. Feeling these truths, the writer, in a letter to the minister, on the subject of our national situation, which he took the liberty of sending to him on the 29th of January last, confined not his observations to the *military* branch of the constitution, but paid equal attention to the *civil* also. Amongst other remarks, were these: "at the very awful
 " conjuncture in *England's* existence at which we
 " are arrived, it is not, Sir, in the human mind
 " for a presiding minister to reflect on the situation
 " of the state, internal and external, without the
 " utmost anxiety, and emotions of a very untran-
 " quilizing nature. Internally, the state is diseased
 " at the heart: externally, its danger is unprece-
 " dented. Things cannot, Sir, go on in the course
 " that has brought us into this situation, without
 " leading to some fatal catastrophe. It is consoling,
 " however, to know that, for either evil that has
 " been alluded to, a remedy, if not too long de-
 " layed, may be found in the plain dictates of the
 " CONSTITUTION. *A constitution, Sir, that can*
 " *rescue us from the perils of such a situation,*
 " *ought to command our admiration, and to insure*
 " *our attachment.* Call it, then, Sir, to your
 " aid." &c.

Does not the writer already see this constitution,

like an up-starting giant, snapping asunder the bands of indifference and sloth, in which for centuries it has slumbered, and re-stamping on the nation that martial-character which gave it of old its freedom and its fame ! In this age of stupendous events, preparing for the human race some new destiny, he sees *England* on the eve of reassuming her proper attitude, and of recovering on the continent a beneficial influence. In defending, by the arms of freemen, her own soil and her own honour, he sees her teaching the brave, but unfortunate nations around, the secret of defence and independence, and their statesmen the true balance of power. But, how slow soever they may be to profit by the great example, he trusts that every day's progress in political reformation will render the task at home more easy and more delightful.

We are now too much familiarized to the rise and fall of kingdoms, as well as to domestic events on a scale of uncommon magnitude, and have penetrated too much into the secret of revolutions and of conquests having their origin in that WANT of freedom, in that soul-sinking DESPOTISM, which makes governments not worth preserving, and countries not worth defending, to be any longer liable to strong delusions unfavourable to our own liberties, or to be seized with panics at mere opinions, instead of approving or disapproving of them, according to

their merit ; and a constitutional arming, seen at first sight to secure property and privilege, must, more than all, free us from those unworthy agitations of spirit, to which a nation, claiming freedom, but without arms in its possession, must, like a timid child, be ever subject. Confident and composed, a people born to, and enjoying freedom,

“ Of rights and laws and lofty themes discourse,”

And, at all times are equally prepared, with steadiness and temper, to restore “ to full vigour and energy,” their own decayed institutions, whether *military* or *civil*; and otherwise, in periods of awful danger, to act with immoveable fortitude that part on the theatre of human existence, to which, by the dispensations of Providence they have been called. A people who, by only resorting to the energies of their own constitution, can stand the shock of *the Colossal despotism which bestrides so many prostrate nations*, and can *grapple with the giant single-handed*, are no longer to be duped by the stupid cant of *danger*, in attempting to check *a petty faction of corrupt men*; and I trust that such a people will never be diverted from seeking a constitutional reformation of abuses, which are as intolerable for the flagrant violation of public rights, as they are destructive of public morals, and incompatible with public honour.

To those who so oft have wondered that the writer should have persevered, under all discouragements, in season and out of season, in recommending a *civil* reform which they deemed unattainable, and who wondered yet more when, some years ago, he laboured to promote a *military* reform beyond all comparison, still less to be looked for, the present time is peculiarly instructive. In the critical moment of danger and of need, they see the last mentioned reform brought, by a spontaneous act of the government, to the relief of the nation; and, although as yet much short of perfection, hailed with enthusiasm by the people, as the only means of their salvation. Effects, however, come not without their appropriate causes; and those who, in the contemplation of causes, have a foresight of effects, those who foresee public evils, and know their proper remedies, and who entertain rational notions of the nature of man, will ever feel a steady confidence in the progressive, the powerful, though possibly slow workings of truth on the human mind; and will feel persuaded that a day will come, when their counsels will not be despised, nor themselves be reviled. Let not, therefore, the friends of a reform in the representation of the people in parliament be discouraged. In due time, the necessity of resisting the *borough*-invaders of our liberties will be as manifest as is at present the necessity of arming

against the *Gallic* invaders of our land; and its adoption will be as popular and enthusiastic. To the discerning, it is already seen, (and upon the principles we have discussed) that the ground-work of a system of defence cannot be perfect, *until the public interest in the CONSTITUTION is at the highest.*

It was when writing on the subject of putting arms into the hands of the citizens, under a new militia law of that period, that, in the year 1797, the Earl of *Liverpool*, in his *Discourse on the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force in England*, begins with remarking “that the constitution of every *free* government is subject from time to time to a sort of dangerous *crisis*, which demands the attention of all who are concerned in its preservation.”

“The fluctuation of property, the change of manners or disposition in the people, and *the shifting of power from one neighbouring state to another*, must variously affect it.

“If the CONSTITUTION be only through age impaired, *it must be called back to its first principles.*

“The history of this country abounds with more of these *critical periods* than any other; and it is owing to *the proper use* our ancestors made of them that our government has long been advancing, by various steps, to perfection.

“ They withstood the repeated attempts of both papal innovation and regal oppression ; and though their struggles frequently produced violent fevers in the state, yet the CONSTITUTION came forth in *more perfect health*, and some new security was obtained for our freedom ; and whilst almost every other nation of *Europe*, who, like us, descended from one free and common stock, long ago became the subjects of arbitrary power, and resigned their liberty, this country has always proved a faithful guardian of that sacred deposit, and has alone improved the blessing.”

Are we not, indeed, at this moment, in a striking manner, in respect of *the military branch of our CONSTITUTION*, calling it *back to its first principles* ? And who, except *Bonaparte*, is afraid of the consequences ! And who, in God’s name, except *Bonaparte*, and a certain base-minded clan, the retail hawkers, pedlars, and auctioneers of our borough wares, and their owners, would be alarmed, if this calling *back to first principles* extended likewise to the *civil* branch of that Constitution ? The *Corsican*, we may be assured, is the great and good ally of these traffickers, ready to aid them by his services, or his subsidies, or friendly counsels. We know his agreement with them in opinion. We remember his founding the present French Constitution on “ *Liberty, Equality, and THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM* ;” which “ *REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM*,”

modelled by his hand, with its due proportion of *patronage* and *influence*, is exactly what its creator intended; that is to say, in shadow and mockery, it is *civil representation*; in substance and calamity it is *military dominion*, with its never-failing concomitant, *taxation at the will of him who rules by the sword instead of the sceptre*; to the great benefit of *France*, and to the extraordinary satisfaction of the rest of *Europe*.

When the *Nabob of Arcot* had a point to carry in this country, he very sensibly sent his emissaries amongst those to whom I have alluded, and quietly bought of them his seven or eight seats. And when the horrid *African* man-trade was, if possible, to be upheld against the almost universal humanity and justice of this nation, manifested by petitions innumerable, the market of the speculators in the *English-Borough* man-trade was remarkably brisk; their commodities had many bidders at good prices amongst the *commercial agents of Jamaica*, and were bought by wholesale; and the consequence was that the *gold of Jamaica* prevailed over the *justice and humanity of England*. Is *Bonaparte*, then, the only politician to overlook his own interest? Is he the only statesman who knows not *where* to place to most advantage *his* commercial agents; or the only potentate who has no *gold* at his command?

Hear me, ye defenders of the state! Hear me, ye advocates for UNANIMITY! If *freedom and a heart-*

felt attachment to our government be the very basis, the life, the soul of *defence on right principles*, shut up the swindling shop, and arrest that canker-worm that has well nigh eaten to the very core of your liberties! Remove that wide-spreading grief and discontent that does, and necessarily must, reside in every reflecting bosom, at a *taxation discretionary in the minister of the day*, and at a *corrupt influence* that pervades, poisons, and *debilitates* every department of the state, by substituting a corrupt parliamentary interest for public virtue and merit, as the recommendation to every employment! Call back your Constitution to those *first principles* for which, and for which alone, it is the object of *England's* attachment, and the admiration of enlightened nations!—Unanimity raised on hollow foundations is the house of the foolish man! which he built upon the sand: when the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house, it fell, and great was the fall of it. A unanimity built on the rock of the Constitution is that alone which can defy the storm.

Mere universal travelling in the same track, either from coercion, or for quiet against absurd prejudice, is the unanimity of sheep before the driver. The unanimity of men is of the head, the heart, the lifted arm. It is the unanimity of reason and conviction, of passion and energy. It glows in the bosom, it

sparkles in the eye, it flashes from a million of free swords, as they leap from the scabbard in defence of liberty. Let such alone be the unanimity of ENGLAND !

1.

Dear land ! when ALFRED first thy sceptre sway'd,
Thine anguish he with parent eye survey'd,
Invaded, ravag'd by a ruthless foe :
Alike, maids, matrons, infants, rustics, feel
The murd'rous death-strokes of the Danish steel,
And flame-wrapp'd domes bespeak the gen'ral woe.

2.

High Heav'n inspires—the pious hero plans—
Embattled, straight, thy civic army stands,
A tithing-bas'd ubiquitary force !
Maids, matrons, infants, rustics, bleed no more ;
Thy plains their smiles resume ; thy frowning shore
The foe astounds ; he shuns the fatal course.

3.

Then, when ferocious Gauls besiege thy gate,
And come, they boast, to seal thy downward fate,
Shalt thou with God-taught ALFRED's lore dispense ?
What sage has ris'n, of more exalted name ?

What field-form'd warrior, of illustrious fame,
 Worthier to counsel in thy State's defence ?

4.

Glow's in his patriot breast a purer fire ?

Can he to more heroic deeds inspire

Thy sons, than he who, from an *English* throne,

The *Roman*, *Spartan*, and *Athenian* sage

Eclips'd, as all, of each succeeding age ;

And, godlike, first in civic wisdom shone ?

5.

More dear than life, then, prize his matchless code ;

Nor time impairs it, nor foul rusts corrode—

A beam from God,—pure gold without alloy *!

Nor sloth, nor base ingratitude, be thine ;

Each error rectify, oppose design,

Laws to defeat, which nothing can destroy.

6.

Would'st Thou, O, shame ! an ingrate vile appear ?

Or folly's pupil, when the foe is near ?

No : wise, as brave, the boastful Gaul defy !

* It is the well-known definition of the common law of England, that it is *the perfection of reason*.

• To drive him from thy gate, in foul disgrace,
To vindicate thy fame, thy laws, thy race,

FROM ALFRED'S BOW, O LET THINE ARROWS FLY !

In the present crisis of our affairs, it is to be hoped that none have influence in the counsels of our country, who " have betaken themselves to state affairs with souls so unprincipled in virtue and true " generous breeding *," as to feel insensible to a JONES's admonition? Or to remain untaught by the wisdom,—untouched by the goodness—or unawed from despising or violating the Constitution, by the transcendant name of an ALFRED ?

The recent patriot declaration of " HIM IN " WHOSE VEINS THE BLOOD OF ALFRED " FLOWS," must be highly gratifying to every lover of his country. " *Embarked with my brave and " loyal people in one COMMON CAUSE, it is my " fixed determination, if the occasion should " arise, to share their exertions and their dangers, in defence of our CONSTITUTION, our " RELIGION, our LAWS, and INDEPENDENCE.*"

What sovereign, through the whole range of potentates, except a KING OF ENGLAND, can talk to his people of a CONSTITUTION, of LAWS, of

* Milton.

INDEPENDENCE—in which he and they have a COMMON INTEREST, and can make a COMMON CAUSE? There is not one. On this advantage ground an English king, over kings consuls and emperors, stands gloriously pre-eminent; and an English people proudly distinguished.

Let us give credit to his Majesty's advisers, for having adopted, as the vehicle of the royal sentiments, words which were not lightly chosen; words which conveyed, to those who employed them, the same "*distinct ideas**" of the things expressed as they convey to all others, who are acquainted with the objects mentioned, and that they who penned the speech, as constitutional statesmen, conceived its extensive scope; as Englishmen felt its whole force; and, as responsible ministers, intended to give the nation a solemn and religious pledge that they should be found the same men in actions as in words.

Let us give them credit for having properly discriminated between "OUR CONSTITUTION" and its *violations*; as well as between those eternal principles of right reason and justice, which, as being the foundations of our government and the safeguards of our freedom, are emphatically called

See p. 94.

"OUR LAWS," and mere *imperfect statutes*, which are too frequently disfigured with *unwise* or *arbitrary* enactments.

And when they apply to the PEOPLE, as well as to the KING, the word INDEPENDENCE, let us equally give them credit for meaning that that independence of BOTH, which they are now mutually to defend at the hazard of life, is to be a true and genuine independence of EACH, *agreeably to the CONSTITUTION*; that is, on one hand, an INDEPENDENCE, by means of which the KING ought to receive the revenue of his kingdom, and to exercise its executive authority, in conformity only with the wisdom of an INDEPENDENT parliament: and not shamefully to be controuled by, and *dependent* upon, *a few individuals*, who should claim to themselves an absolute power over the national purse; because, forsooth, they were the proprietors of *certain* stocks and stones, and other property in *certain* boroughs, or the purchasers of borough venality; and, on the other hand, an INDEPENDENCE by which the PEOPLE ought likewise to have their RIGHTS, their LIBERTIES, and their PROPERTY, under the guardianship of such an INDEPENDENT parliament; and not at the disposal of such owners of stocks and stones, or of such traffickers in iniquity. Were such a faction ever to exist, and to acquire the power of holding

in bonds both KING and PEOPLE, nothing would be wanting to dissolve the spell of such a ridiculous bondage, but a single review of the corps in Hyde-Park.

When KING and PEOPLE, at a period so awful that the passing day cannot close without the contemplation of some mighty danger to the state, are solemnly pledging themselves to each other to meet that danger with their united swords, let us hope ministers have been actuated by those high thoughts which are the growth of great minds in perilous situations; and which, by a sense of the right principles of action, inspire fortitude; and, through a consciousness of integrity, confer serenity amidst the wildest ragings of the tempest.

Such statesmen will know the energies of an English Constitution, *military and civil*. To those energies they will give full scope. Have the energies been "*disgracefully neglected*?" Such statesmen will "*restore them to full vigour*."—Have they been clogged and deprived of their spring, by falling among filth? Such statesmen will cleanse away the filth, and restore their elasticity. Such statesmen, when they name "*OUR CONSTITUTION*," aware of the jugglings and impostures that have been carried on under cover of that abused word, will be eager to show, by their conduct, their fidelity to **POLITICAL LIBER-**

TY: when they speak of "OUR LAWS," they will be equally desirous of manifesting, by actions, their attachment to "CIVIL FREEDOM: when they talk of "OUR INDEPENDENCE," they will not rest until they have proved their meaning to extend, not merely to an exemption from national vassalage to a foreign despot, but an exemption also from all domestic vassalage to any unconstitutional faction; and, in these days of unprincipled ambition, such statesmen will likewise have an honest pride, in contrasting the purity of their own conduct, with the treachery and hypocrisy of a *Bonaparte*, who, at the moment he was imitating *Cromwell* in annihilating a legislature, and subjugating his fellow citizens to military despotism, glossed over the foul act with the artful cant of founding a constitution on LIBERTY, EQUALITY, and the REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM.

It has been already observed (p. 19.) that those who administer an English Constitution, have in their hands the fountains of UNANIMITY and ENTHUSIASM; and this is the case, in a more eminent degree, when they have it in their power, by the restoration of rights the most sacred, and the revival of institutions the most essential to freedom, to property, to national security and honour, to recommend themselves to the approbation, and to seat themselves in the hearts of the people. And what

time, of all others, is the most favourable for reformation of awful magnitude and constitutional grandeur? Not, most assuredly, under the relaxation of peace and fancied security, when danger disappears, when the public mind seeks repose, when the bow of patriotism is unstrung, and when faction's hydra, with her thousand heads, has little to deter her from opening all her mouths in the cause of encroachment and abuse. No: the season of peril, and of deep anxiety—the season that rivets on the public interest national attention, and rouses in the public cause the national energy—the season which brings home to the understandings and the feelings of a people the weakness of those parts of the constitutional fortress which have fallen into decay—and the season when selfishness and faction dare not encounter the public eye—this is the season for such reformation: And the statesman by whose wisdom and vigour they are effected, and who thereby conquers both the enemies of his country and her own corruptions, receives from his contemporaries and from posterity, not only of his own but of all nations, a crown of applause, before which the laurel of the proudest warrior appears but an unsightly weed.

I am not reporting to ministers any symptoms of remorse, or of returning virtue, in a faction

which, in order to fire the public mind with the universal flame of patriotism, ought at this crisis to surrender the inordinate and mischievous power it possesses, in violation of common right, incompatible with the security of private property, undermining all wholesome discipline in every department of the public service, and damping to a melancholy degree that ardour in our country's cause, which springs from a proud consciousness in the great mass of the people of possessing real freedom; for there are infatuations in all descriptions of vice, which, if the strong hand of reforming power do not interpose, carry on their votaries, with sealed eyes, even to a sure destruction. Neither am I telling ministers of existing petitions or specific demands at the present moment, for the measures to which I am directing their thoughts; for *hope long deferred maketh the heart sick*, until disgust, if not alienation, sits for a while brooding in silence and in apathy over the actions of the ruler, even in moments most propitious to political salvation. But if I am not telling ministers of active virtue and patriotic exertions of particular descriptions, I am nevertheless telling them—I hope unnecessarily—how they may save their country. If, unfortunately for us, they shall not see that, to that end, it is necessary *to call back to its*

first principles, both MILITARY and CIVIL, our impaired CONSTITUTION, it can only be said that, by them, our country cannot be saved; and the greater the efforts that should be made, to carry her in any other way through the present struggle, would only accelerate her fall.

CONCLUSION.



TO what cause do you owe the present war?—Did *Bonaparte*, with only the wreck of a navy, hope to wrest from you *Malta*, by force of arms? Or *Gibraltar*?—Or your *Newfoundland* fishery? Or *Canada*? Or your *West India* islands? or to expel you from your immense empire in the *East*? No: not one of these could be his object. But he saw your unpreparedness for war at *home*; he was probably as ignorant, as some people on this side of the water, of *the military branch of your Constitution*, and was in hopes he could be prepared for invasion before you could be prepared for resistance. He trusted to your having no material resource for military strength, but in the augmentation of your standing army, the expense of which is so ruinous to a country exhausted by debts and taxes; and to the interruption he could create to your commerce with the continent, as another stroke upon your finances. Had he seen the *military branch of your Constitution* “*restored to full vigour and energy*,” and that you could disconcert his projects *without expense*, you would have had NO WAR.

This position I lay down as that to which I doubt not every one who has attentively perused these pages will subscribe.

We have, it is true, raised a great *volunteer* force ; such as, in addition to regulars and militia, ministers *calculate* to be sufficient for our defence. But the *calculations* of *Bonaparte* afford to his mind so different a result that he continues his preparations for invasion, and we continue to *experience the expenses of war, and its other inconveniences*. So much, then, for the first fruits of *calculation*. If war in the bowels of our own country should be another of its fruits, we shall certainly have to gather that fruit amidst torrents of blood, and perhaps amongst the ruins of villages reduced to ashes, and of towns set in flames. But, in the necessary work and duty of national arming, with *calculation* we have nothing to do.

Had the system of universal arming been only an *occasional* provision of our Constitution, as an extraordinary security in time of WAR, then, indeed, there might have been a pretence for considering such arming as a subject of *calculation*, according to the aspect of the war, and the estimate of danger.— But in that case our Constitution would have been no better than that of *Belgium*. With the Constitution of ENGLAND, however, this is by no means the case ; for at all times, whether of WAR or of

PEACE, it equally prescribes a universal arms-bearing ; which, indeed, is *necessarily a feature of every government that is not a despotism*. Who admits that any government can deny a man the use of one of his eyes ? Or of one of his hands ? Or the use of clothing, as a defence against the weather ? Or of any other requisite towards his preservation ? How, then, without despotism, can it deny a man the use of arms ? But it has already been proved that to preserve society in peace and security is equally the business of all its members ; so that what is the mere *right of the man* is the *duty of the citizen*.

Should government even go on, increasing the number of the armed ; until the enemy, despairing of success in his attacks upon our country, should consent to peace, yet, if the arming should stop short one jot of a complete revival of the *posse comitatus* in a state of PERMANENT arms-bearing, neither ministers nor parliament would be justified. This would still be CALCULATION, instead of the CONSTITUTION ; as well as a ground for other *calculations*, by which we might in a short time, besides losing our freedom, be again reduced to a state of as complete unpreparedness for defence against invasion as we experienced at the breaking out of the present war ; and be exposed to a fresh rupture, whenever it might please *France* to bring upon us the like calamity,

with a view of ruining our finances, convulsing our empire, and striking at our existence.

Many persons, from not seeing in the cabinet a *Wolfe*, a *Peterborough*, or a *Marlborough*, have anxiously expressed a wish, that a *Military Council* had been formed, for directing the military energies of the country; particularly for preserving by our arms the existence of our state. If, indeed, we are to depend for our safety upon military *calculation*, we may stand in need of military genius the most transcendant; and even that may fail us: but if, as an *Ægis* of Defence, we shall not *reject* the Constitution, then, from the moment we shall have armed and organized our population, superior military genius, although still acceptable, will by no means be necessary. Resting this assertion on the case of invasion, which is put to the reader in p. 86, of this work, there I shall leave it without fear of contradiction.

We have also our advocates for *fortifications*.— Dock-yards, and other very valuable objects *immediately on the coast*, a remarkable pass, or point of natural strength, in the way to such valuable objects, or to the capital, which an enemy dare not leave in his rear, might become an object of fortification; *provided an enemy could otherwise approach the valuable object before a constitutional force could oppose and overpower him.* Beyond this, fortifica-

tions at the best, are useless and expensive toys, or strong holds dangerous to national freedom ; and, inasmuch as they are *contrivances to prevent fighting*, they are disgraceful and pernicious. When a large country is not fortified in the swords, and the bravery of its people, it cannot be defended.

One parting word to the Volunteers. In consequence of your corps having been made part of a system of defence upon *military calculation*, the toil of your training has been twenty times as great as, under a *constitutional system of defence*, it needed to have been. Under the former of those systems, an army is a piece of mechanism ; which, in order to do its work, must be long in the hands of the maker, and highly finished : because success depends upon military refinements under the direction of superior genius : whereas, under the latter system, when the success may be trusted to the physical strength of an immense superiority of numbers, and in which no generalship of the enemy can keep him out of the reach of the weapons of determined Englishmen, all that is *absolutely necessary* is learned very soon indeed.

Perhaps also it is part of the necessary *policy* of standing armies, to make men those machines we observe ; to metamorphose their heads with pomatum and powder ; to lay a stress upon whole battalions pulling the trigger in the same instant of time ; and to employ them in doing a thousand things upon

a parade which are useless in the field ; and, while we shall contrive to arm on the *calculating* system, the whole of our military force will doubtless be trained after one fashion.

Under a constitutional system, we should have the good sense to introduce a new mode of training ; not but that particular corps, in each weapon-take, such as the proposed cavaliers and gentlemen at arms, composed, as is probable, of men of leisure, might take a higher military polish than the rest ; and if all our youth were well instructed while at school, they would enter society ready made soldiers. Were I not studious of conciseness, the subject would lead me into some detail which, until we have not a real *posse comitatus*, may be premature. It would be the fault of the government if *such a militia* wanted a proper discipline ; or such a degree of military skill as to cause invaders to fall before it, come they in what numbers they might. What want we more ?

A few words, also, to those who view our pecuniary situation with eyes of despondency. As WAR has been the cause of all our debt, it is our true policy to avoid war ; but still with national honour.—How to bring to a conclusion the present war, and to secure to ourselves an honourable and durable peace, I presume these pages have explained. It is by being absolutely invulnerable at home, even without a navy ; by having that navy always at com-

mand for foreign services, and such a mass of men trained to arms as promptly to furnish armies for those services in any number. A great nation, if always thus prepared for war, will have durable peace.

According to our ministerial financiers, the sinking fund was to discharge the national debt in little more than forty years, although our *military* and *naval* establishments should have remained according to their ultimates. But, if we can reduce them to less than one half, as should seem to be the necessary effect of restoring THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THE CONSTITUTION TO FULL VIGOUR AND ENERGY; and, if we can preserve peace for half forty years, which should seem to be another necessary effect of that restoration, then our debt would be extinguished in half the time calculated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Thus the reform we recommend holds out to us a rational prospect of that which, while perpetually subject to new wars, must have been a mere chimera. How long was it, after Mr. *Pitt* sung the praises of the sinking fund, before *he* involved the country in a new WAR? And how long was it again, after we had heard the same song from Mr. *Addington*, that WAR again blew all his *pecuniary calculations* into the air. I wish his *military calculations* may fare better.—Neither of these statesmen could, or pretended to, hold out to you a rational ground of ex-

pectation, on which any man of experience or observation could depend for the continuance of peace, until the national debt should be discharged.

But let us indulge the pleasing hope, presented in the pages of the *Ægis*, that our country may see that happy day. We must then anticipate, as the writer on other occasions observed, from the reduction of taxes, and the altered scale of our expenses, the triumph of our manufactures over competition in every foreign market; agriculture improved, to gardening; commerce and navigation extending their sphere, and awakening to a friendly intercourse, and to civilization, the yet torpid nations; while the overflowings of wealth and of population would stimulate to new enterprize, and beget new colonies, planting the principles of true liberty, and the arts of beneficent government, in the most distant regions of the earth; making England the friend of man, and man over the face of the globe the friend of England.

Here, requesting the reader to look back to the table, in p. 47, and maturely to weigh in his mind the organization there proposed, I shall now anticipate and obviate two opposite objections thereto, which may be started. On one hand, it may be said that this arming, powerful as it may appear, falls yet short of the principle of the constitution; for, where all are free, all of course are to be arm-

ed, or the Constitution will be violated: On the other hand, it may be observed that here are already more armed men than are necessary to *defence*.

In answer to the first objection, I fully admit the principle of the universal duty of arms-bearing; without which it is evident that his majesty cannot, as emergencies may require, have the full benefit of "the military services of all his liege subjects;" nor will I violate that principle. But men are to be differently armed, according to their pecuniary means; so that those who remain, after our arming in the manner and to the extent above-mentioned, may, as I have before intimated, be armed with pikes, spears, swords, or even with staves, which are the ordinary weapons of our constables; which inferior arms, considering the provision of superior arms already made, may be very sufficient for supporting on all occasions the civil magistrate in keeping the peace; and may also, in the repelling of hostile invasion, be as much as convenient, to those who should act as pioneers, drivers, &c. &c. in an army.

In replying to the second objection, I must first, with Sir *William Jones*, recommend that we acquire "*distinct ideas*" on our subject, before we offer plans. Now, little as it may be suspected, the word "*defence*," according to the mouth that utters it, has widely different meanings; and indeed, de-

fence itself, as a motive, has with different rulers different *objects*. The objects of *defence* to an arbitrary ruler are two in number; first, *his own despotic power* against his own subjects; secondly, the country he governs, that is, *his own territory and dominion*, against other powers. Here all centres in *self*: but the ruler of a free state feels the duty of defending *the people, their property and peace*; and even personal power, if it stand in the way of the public good, will be surrendered. Too much praise, in this respect, cannot be given to the act of his present majesty, by which the king's judges were deprived of a dangerous power, which they had long exercised against law, to the oppression of persons tried on a charge of libel; from which oppression they are now *defended*.

But, to keep at present to military considerations, the arbitrary ruler, contemplating *his two objects*, and possibly with views also of aggrandizement, and counting his *pecuniary means and resources*, arms upon CALCULATION; whereas the ruler of a free state, not being so limited, nor having any interest hostile to the interest of the public, arms according to the PHYSICAL STRENGTH OF THE STATE. If the country of the despot be in danger of attack, he still arms upon CALCULATION; he still arms upon a principle as hostile to his people as to his foreign enemy. He merely CALCULATES.

how he shall *ultimately* preserve the country and the dominion to *himself*. Instead of reading instruction in the book of danger, so that his people may have the blessing of freedom and he the benefit of their physical strength, he still cleaves to despotic power, and its cruel, its infernal policy.

As to the devastation that may take place in the fields of his unhappy subjects, the devouring their harvests and burning their habitations ; the ruin, the famine, the rapes, the butchery, and all the unspeakable miseries of having their country **THE SEAT OF WAR**, all these, provided they do not defeat his object, of *ultimately* holding the country to *himself*, are of little account ; nay, he himself will adopt desolation as a part of his military system, and aid in ruining his subjects that he may continue to rule over them, as well as that he may distress his invading enemy. To call such detestable policy by the sacred name of **DEFENCE** is to prophane the heavenly gift of speech. But the defence taught and provided by the **ENGLISH CONSTITUTION** is defence indeed. At all times, and in all seasons, it is equally at every point of the coast, and at every man's door. Restore but **THE MILITARY BRANCH OF THAT CONSTITUTION** to "full vigour and energy," and then neither *French* ravagers can make your country the **SEAT OF WAR**, nor can riot or insurrection ever disturb your internal repose. **I**

trust it is now seen that, in the proposed organization, there is not one man, nor one-musquet too much.

“Our constitutional system gives a cavalry of above 26,000, easily capable of an increase to any necessary amount; and an equal number of a peculiar corps of infantry; both of which must be formed of noblemen, gentlemen, and persons of the best property; the majority of whom, having sufficient leisure for practice, would early acquire the necessary skill: also a body of grenadiers of nearly 180,000, and as many light infantry, both in the prime of manhood, and consequently apt by nature to learn their military duty with alacrity, while the country remained in danger. And even of serjeants and corporals it furnishes 95,000 men; and of superior officers above 76,000 more.

“The officers, with the serjeants and corporals in an army, says an acute observer, are the *ligaments* and *the nerves* of that artificial body;—“the ligaments of military union, and the organs of military sensibility and judgment*.” This being the case, it will appear that, by bestowing particular attention on the training of these, we lay the foundation for bringing the whole mass into a state of sufficient discipline in a short time, whenever appearances of danger should call for more

* Williams's Letters on Political Liberty, p. 54.

than that ordinary attention, which should ever be kept up to the use of arms in times of peace."

In p. 33, 57, and 58, I have noticed the heavy expense of raising for the present war *one hundred thousand men* ; stating that, in the original *bounty-money* alone, the cost was not less than *three millions and a half*, which is more than the whole annual revenue of the kingdom of *Denmark* ; and I know it to be the opinion of an experienced and judicious person that, including the expence of carrying the laws for raising these men into execution, and all the consequent charges alluded to in p. 58, the whole real expense is probably more than *double* the original bounty ; which makes it upwards of *seven millions*. This, however, enormous as is the sum, is not all ; for, in order to induce the Army of Reserve levies to volunteer for general service, they have had, as I understand, an additional bounty of seven or eight pounds per man, adding to the former sum about *three hundred thousand pounds more*, and making a total of *seven millions three hundred thousand pounds*. Well may the appetite of the armies of *Bonaparte* be whetted for the plunder of such a country !

If such be our expense in a mere *preparatory* item, towards having an army of **MERCENARY TROOPS** ; and if, even at the present advanced prices of all military equipments, the sum just mentioned.

would have furnished handsome musquets, bayonets, belts and pouches, that is, arms and accoutrements, sufficient to have lasted for three generations, for about *two millions and a quarter* of the civil state, who have no bounties for performing a common duty of society; or would have provided the like equipment for the *twelve hundred thousand men* (supposing them all infantry) proposed in these pages to have fire-arms; and have left a surplus of *three millions four hundred thousand pounds*, or above 2*l.* 16*s.* 6*d.* per man, towards other military expenses; what an additional argument is here for arming according to THE CONSTITUTION!

But why want we any arguments at all, where an indispensable an imperative duty is in question? I wish Mr. *Windham* in particular, comprehensively and dispassionately, to contemplate the subject *in all its parts, and in all its aspects*, and then to give us his honest opinion, supported by sound reasons, on the best mode of defending *that* country, to which belongs the *English Constitution*—whether by the swords of FREE men, or of *mercenaries*?—*Mercenaries indeed!* who, at such a juncture, sell their services to their country at such a rate!

When, instead of the *amor patriæ*, or antigallican ardour, avarice has thus deeply struck its deadly root into the heart of that class of whom your mercenary army is composed, what mind, the least endued with

foresight, but may foretel the fatal consequence of the *predominance* in a country of such soldiers !— Can any considerate statesman look back to the frightful events which, not six years ago, took place at *Spithead*, at *Plymouth*, and at the *Nore* ; or can ponder on the *cause* that kept our armies out of camp in 1798, and not discern a portentous danger in principally, or even *materially*, confiding our defence to a description of persons who, as a prelude to entering into their country's service at double the pay she gave ten years ago, have laid that country under a military contribution, greater than *Bonaparte* has yet collectively exacted from *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Holland* and the *Hans Towns* ? And if these enormous bounties are squandered for the most part in profligate gratifications, so much the worse ; so much the readier so much the greedier will be those, who have so spent what they have so extorted, for new extortions. Is not this the way to debauch your own defenders, to undermine every idea of a generous devotion to the public cause ; and to ingraft into the bosoms of your army all the vices of mere soldiers of fortune, disposing them to be at the beck of the highest bidder ?

Were ministers, instead of perfecting their own plan for arming the *civil* state, to pursue once more the insane policy which was a main cause of the fall of *Carthage*, that of trusting to mercenaries, I

should then say, let the successful citizen tremble for his wealth, and the country gentleman for his acres; let the noble be prepared to part with his coronet and his estate; and his majesty with his crown: but his majesty's present government has made no small progress in a better system, and I trust will immediately amend its defects, and follow it up ere the great tempter arrive.

Seeing the enormity of the bounties exacted by the hireling soldier, how strongly does experience confirm the truth of my observations five years ago, when, in the *Appeal, Civil and Military, &c.* * I said, "It becomes every day, and every hour, more and more evident that the natural, the cheap, the only defence of nations, is in *an armed inhabitancy*. The stimulus to that defence is *LIBERTY*. With your navies, and your armies, and your *millions a year* for their support, *France* is already acquainted: but she only exerts with more alacrity her powers of hostility; and probably accounts the vastness of your expense to be more in *her* favour than your own. Change your system, and you will change hers.—Reform your representation, strike off the bulk of your expense, while at the same time you arm more than *a million of men*, whose equipments for a ge-

* See p. 97.

neration to come will not cost four millions of money, and her threats of invasion will melt into invitations to peace.

Regardless of artificial ditch, or mound of inanimate earth, our sea-girt isle would thus become an inaccessible camp; her sole outwork, nature's restless wave; and her only interior fortification the living bulwark of her warlike sons. Her hamlets and villages would pour out their hundreds; her towns and cities their thousands and tens of thousands; every rateable house within her wide domain a castle; and every inhabitant a possessor, and a free soldier*: Interested in the security of property and the preservation of peace, proud of the constitution of their ancestors, attached to the laws and customs of their country, and knowing and feeling that the same chain of loyalty bound the commons, the nobles of the land, and the king upon the throne, in one common interest and duty, Englishmen could not be subdued by the world in arms †!"

* Soldier and Freeman, amongst the ancient Germans, were synonymous terms. See *Robertson's Charles VI.* p. 1.

† In this quotation there has been an alteration of only two words relative to *expense*; the ratio of which is even altered within the short time that has elapsed since the passage was first written,

Notwithstanding the General Defence Act claims on the part of his majesty, "the military services of all his liege subjects," and provides for their being called into action, I have been informed that, during the very passage of the Act through the houses of parliament, some of the ministers were considerably affected by a panic, on contemplating the consequences of their own measure. They were told of danger from arming the people; and, from the very numerous offers of service they have since rejected, and the great degree in which they have suspended the statute, it should seem indeed as if there was some truth in the information. It is not surprising that statesmen, trained in "the policy of the three last centuries," should be staggered at the new idea of arming at once a million or two of men; especially according to the regular operation of the statute they had hastily framed: but, had they begun at the right end of their work, that is, by first arming the householders assessed to taxes, comprehending about eight hundred thousand persons,—*the possessors of all the property of the state*,—they would then have had a secure foundation; and then to have called on an additional number equal to only half of the first named, for likewise carrying fire-arms; taking care, at the same time, to have revived all the admirable principles of the laws of *posse comitatus*, 'tis impossible

that such an arming could have given alarm to any one having the slightest pretensions to a sound understanding, the slightest knowledge of our constitution, or the slightest regard to the liberties of our country; and it cannot be too earnestly pressed upon ministers, if they would not see their country the SEAT OF WAR, and A STAKE PLAYED FOR BY CONTENDING GENERALS, not to lose a moment in so carrying into effect their own statute.

“To suppose the system of a general arming under the civil magistracy in the smallest degree dangerous to the ordinary peace of the country, were to suppose it a country without civilization or laws; and that men would be more disposed, or more able, to commit violence, or felony, or open treason, when *suppression*, or *apprehension*, or *death*, would be infinitely more certain and speedy than at present; for we all know, and it is to the scandal of our country, that under our late wretched system, the *civil power* scarcely ever pretended to the ability of quelling a riot, without military aid; and we have seen too many instances, in which that aid has not arrived until the greatest mischiefs and abominations have been perpetrated: whereas, it is a self-evident proposition in police that, if every taxed householder were an armed citizen, every thing tending to a riot must be *crushed in the bud*, and all serious mischief must be *pre-*

vented. As well might any one argue against the *general possession* of the powers of body or mind, for our self-defence and security, as against the common and general possession of arms. It is not the *common*, but the *exclusive* possession of arms:—it is not the *universality*, but the *monopoly*, which produces the mischief and the abomination;—and that worst of all mischiefs and abominations, A MILITARY GOVERNMENT. SUFFRAGE and ARMS being the rights of nature, well has it been observed that *representation* is the happiest discovery of political wisdom; and that, *to govern all by all*, is the great master-piece of executive government.—When Sir *William Temple* has remarked on the English Constitution, that “it seems to be a strain of what *Heraclitus* said, was the only skill or knowledge of any value in politics, which was the secret of governing all by all;” he adds, “what prince soever can hit off this great secret *needs know no other* for his own safety and happiness, or that of the people he governs*.”

Let me take leave of the constellation of statesmen, historians, and philosophers, whose opinions I have quoted on the nature of armies, by observing that, as standing armies and despotic power are the

* I. 220.

causes which have kept the nations of Europe in perpetual war—for that is perpetual war which never ceases but as the work-worn peasant ceases to labour through exhaustion, and which again commences with new means, as the refreshed peasant returns at early morn to his accustomed toil—as standing armies and despotic power are, I say, the causes of perpetual war, it ought to be the universal prayer that political freedom may be universally established, and such armies universally abolished.

It is not even merely from the number, at any time, of which a standing army consists, we are in danger; but likewise from its being a *standing* and *permanent* force, upheld, in the bosom of our freedom, by a law which, to answer its purpose, must necessarily be despotic, and at variance with the mild and beneficent common law of the land. Such an institution, like a taint in the blood, must be the parent of many humours, unfriendly to the health and life of the body politic.

The army is a school, in which our youth take impressions and imbibe sentiments that accompany them through life. Whatever other reading may be neglected, the articles of war must be diligently studied. Whatever other duties may be forgotten, those of an officer must be attended to. In that profession it is every moment's conviction that an army is disgraced and ruined, if discipline be relaxed;

and, with every good officer, it is not more a principle of duty to exact from his inferior a prompt obedience, than a point of honour to yield it to his superior.—Here then, if impressions thus made, and habits of mind thus formed, be not most powerfully counteracted by such reading and reflection as furnish a counterpoise of constitutional knowledge, and an ardent love of liberty, we see how gentlemen are unhappily betrayed into principles adverse to freedom; and how unintentionally and unknowingly they become insensibly moulded to the purposes of arbitrary statesmen.

Now, when we consider the fascinating allurements presented by a military life, not only to the empty and the idle part of our youth, but to those also who have in them the best characteristics of manhood, we must not be surprised to find in the army individuals drawn from every family of any rank or consideration in the kingdom, to be formed to the duties of life, and to all they owe their country, in this dangerous seminary. How widely then must the impressions of a military education be disseminated through the community; and through those classes in particular which have the greatest influence on its destiny! And is it not, in a great degree, from this cause we now see in those classes far less of that high-minded independence, and that bold avowal of a love of liberty, which, while the

other nations of *Europe* so long lay sunk in servitude, once gave the *English* gentleman such a proud pre-eminence?

And, on the reasoning of the Earl of *Liverpool*, in 1757, on standing armies, I would once more warn government against the unconstitutional and fatal error, of not making the arms-bearing of the *civil* state permanent, instead of having continuance only “*during the present war.*” “If it were possible,” says he, “to suppose that an army, thus modelled and powerful, could not be induced to defeat, by one hasty blow, the public-spirited labours of so many centuries, and it would be even wise in a free people to rely on their virtue in this particular, may we not still have reason to apprehend that, by the influence and dependence of so large a body, an interest may be created dangerous and *repugnant to the spirit of our government*, which may direct the legislature in an improper manner, though it may not at once subvert it; which will operate insensibly to our destruction; and though less violent in its progress than the former evil, will be no less fatal to the constitution*? Nothing, I imagine,” says another able writer, “could have rendered

* Lord Hawkesbury's Discourse, p. 67.

“ the keeping up a large army, in time of peace,
 “ in any degree palatable to the representatives of
 “ the people, but the consideration that the interest
 “ which the *officers* had in the community weighed
 “ more with them than their interest in that ser-
 “ vice.”—“ But what security have we that our
 “ army shall always be thus officered? That even
 “ those at present in command shall continue in
 “ that command? And that within the short
 “ compass of a year, soldiers of fortune might not
 “ be advanced in their stead? We have no such
 “ security: many a man of birth, character, and
 “ fortune, has already felt the effects of caprice
 “ and resentment. Who shall say what farther
 “ changes this rage of discipline may produce?
 “ *Is it not possible that these keepers of ours*
 “ *may come to resemble those of a SERAGLIO,*
 “ *and hate the very name of liberty, when totally*
 “ *deprived of their own?*”

Should any disaster befall our country, in consequence of not having attended to the essentials, *civil and military*, of our CONSTITUTION, the author trusts that, in the judgment of that country and of posterity, he shall stand acquitted of having any share in the blame: had he done less than he has done he should not have stood acquitted in his own judgment.

THE
BRITANNIC SPEAR;
 BEING
 AN APPENDIX TO ENGLAND'S *ÆGIS*.

BY JOHN CARTWRIGHT, ESQ.

HAVING, in England's *Ægis*, endeavoured to restore to my country her long lost and "*disgracefully neglected*" *SHIELD*, I now dedicate to her service a newly-invented *SPEAR*.

Should it ever be adopted by other nations, I wish the epithet of *Britannic* to attend it, that the country of its origin may be known. This, I confess, is national pride; but in calling it a *spear*, rather than a *pike*, there is utility.

Spears and pikes are merely two *species* of one *genus*; and, indeed, by the word *spear*, we mean a *short pike*; as, by the word *pike*, we mean a *long*

spear. So that, if they possess any characteristic differences, it seems advisable that they should have discriminating appellations ; in order to prevent confusion or error, either in public orders, or in private discourse, when speaking either of the weapons, or of the corps that wield them.

In recommending to the consideration of the public board charged with the business of arms, and to the public in general, the spear I am about to describe, I shall not lose time in collecting what a variety of eminent writers have said respecting this *genus* of weapon ; and for the most part under the denomination of *pikes* ; because the sight and handling of a weapon itself will convey a better idea of its power than many pages. But I shall nevertheless quote a few short passages from a work recently published by *Egerton*, entitled, “ *The French considered as a Military Nation*,” &c. and from a distinct portion of that work, called, “ *Cursory Remarks on Cannon and Musquetry, shewing the superiority of pikes over them in many instances.*”

The intelligent author observes that “ *Machiavel* maintained that he who could use the javelin, sword and *pike*, with the greatest dexterity, would triumph over the most expert at the management of fire arms.”

That “ the *Romans*, whose practice was invariably to rush forward, to come to close action, and

to fight hand to hand, were superior to their enemies (who trusted more than they did to various machines) in almost every encounter."

"Both in the last war, and the present *, the bayonet, an instrument far, *very far inferior to the pike*, has been used more successfully than the bullet: and as in every battle the contending parties come closer and closer, until it be decided, it is evident, that superior force and superior instruments must finally determine the day.; most especially if the use of them be accompanied by superior courage, and one of the parties do not abandon the ground before it come to close action."

"Every military man must know that velocity is the life of war; and that it must unavoidably be checked and impeded by cumbersome artillery and loads of ammunition. With respect to the present moment, the use of the *pike* is loudly called for. The exercise of it is congenial to the native valour of the inhabitants of Great Britain; but it ought never to be used without a short roman sword, which might be hung at the wrist by the sword knot."

"England's situation, and the innate valour of her inhabitants, give her a decided superiority over the rest of *Europe*; and how much soever we may be dis-

* The writer is supposed to speak of the two parts of our war with *France*, since 1792, as one war.

inclined to undervalue modern manœuvres (because they seem at present necessary from adoption) we cannot help being strong advocates for light artillery, *pikes* and rifles."

"General Wain's army was entirely defeated with a dreadful slaughter, by being attacked in the night by the *British* with bayonets, *the flints having been taken out of the firelocks*. They were attacked on both flanks and in the centre at once, which could not have been done with shot, without the three divisions firing on each other. Had the British had *pikes*, those that were wounded by American bayonets would not have been reached by them. *A man with a bayonet will not fence with a pikeman*. Bayonets in the night will make but a feeble resistance against pikes.

It is a known fact that, among other preparations for a regular descent upon our coast, an immense quantity of *long pikes* have been made for the use of the French army. The French know our superiority over them in the exercise of the bayonet, and they would obviate our force by *long pikes*.

Before I make any observation on the latter part of our author's reasoning, in favour of *long pikes*, I shall proceed to the description of the *Britannic Spear*, as follows :

In the annexed plate, fig. 1 represents a side view of the *SPEAR* ; the shaft of which is cut out of a

plank of well-seasoned ash, elm, beech, or (if those are not to be had) wainscot-oak $1\frac{1}{4}$ inch thick when dressed: the shaft, from *a* to *b*, is 3 feet 10 inches long, and 4 inches broad; at *c*, the breadth is reduced to $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches, and at *d*, to 2 inches; the perpendicular distance from *b* to *d* being 4 inches; from thence to the extremity it still diminishes, although very slightly. The whole length of the shaft is 5 feet 9 inches.

The broad part is called the *flat*; the diminished part the *neck*. The short *gripe* is for the right hand; the long *gripe* for the left hand: the *gripes* are 2 inches deep, and fitted to the hand; the *openings* are one inch wide, and the substance of the *bar* is also 1 inch. Along the centre line of the *bar* and *neck* it may be inserted a *rib* of steel, to secure them from being cut through by a sabre. This *rib* to be sunk into the wood $\frac{1}{8}$ of an inch, and kept steady both by rivets and side slips of wood, $\frac{2}{8}$ of an inch deep, pinned to the shaft by brads: the *rib* itself being $\frac{5}{8}$ deep, and only $\frac{1}{8}$ thick. But, upon mature consideration, the author is more inclined to dispense altogether with the *rib*. Upon the extremity of the shaft is a *ferule* $1\frac{1}{2}$ inch on the deep side. Through this *ferule* passes the *centre-pin* of the *guard*.

Fig. 2. shews the *head* of the spear, with the *guard* across, but without the *spring*, in order that

the positions of the screw-holes may be seen. The holes along the middle line are for strong wood-screws, which are not to penetrate quite through the shaft. The side-holes are for short screws, which unite the *spring* to its metal *bed*, as seen in Fig. 3. The *spring* is the full width of the *bed*. Whether the *guard* be longitudinal, as in Fig. 3. or transverse, as in Fig. 2. the *spring* bears against it, whereby the *guard* is kept in either of these positions at pleasure; but, by the *spring* striking into the cavity of the *guard* as soon as it gets into its transverse position, no force can change that position, until the *spring* be pressed down, that the *guard* may be again forced into its longitudinal direction, as explained in the subjoined *Exercise*. The lower edge of the *guard* is sharp, to cut the hand of an adversary, who might snatch at it in close fight. When entangled with cavalry, if the *guard* should ever be within the reins of the bridle, the same edge might cut them on drawing back the pcar. By means of a *nut* on the end of the centre-pin, the *guard* is made to bear upon the *spring* with a proper degree of tightness.

Fig. 3. Here the *guard* is seen in its longitudinal position; and the *spring*, as screwed at one end down to its *bed*; and at the other, bearing against the *guard*.

OBSERVATIONS.

The author whose "*Cursory Remarks*" on *pikes* have been quoted, and who is evidently in favour of "*long pikes*," says *a man with a bayonet will not fence with a pikeman*; on the contrary, on the well known fencing principle of *fort and feeble*, I imagine that he who has the *bayonet*, from the comparative *shortness* of his weapon, will not only *fence with advantage*, but, supposing *equal skill* in the combatants, with a moral certainty of destroying his enemy.

But the musquet and bayonet is not calculated for effectual *fencing*, which is the strong feature in the *Britannic Spear*; and on that account it is designed to have a superiority over the ordinary *pike*, or the *bayonet*, in the following particulars:

1st. By means of its *guard*, it has new means of parrying a stabbing weapon, such as the pike or the bayonet, either by tossing such weapon above the spearman's head or forcing it to the ground; in either of which cases the spearman is guarded, and the assailant laid open to his assault.

2dly. By means of the *bar*, with or without the steel rib, the spear has the defensive qualities of the quarter-staff, with the advantage of the fingers being guarded; which circumstance, of the guard to

the fingers, must give confidence even in a shock against pikes or bayonets.

3dly. If an adversary, armed with pike or bayonet, attempt, by acting upon the *guard*, to toss the spear above his head, or to force it to the ground, in either case he will deceive himself; for the spearman, by only swivelling his spear so as to give the *guard* a vertical position, causes the weapon of his adversary to fly with a jerk up or down, according to his effort, whereby that adversary then becomes laid open to the spearman's point.

4thly. In all situations, where a brave man can advance upon and close with his enemy, it is conceived that, on the principles of *fort* and *feeble*, the comparative *shortness* of the *Britannic spear* gives it a decided advantage over the *long pike*; and that the longer the pike may be, the greater will be the advantage of the *spear*.

We have heard of using long spears in defence through *hedges*; but what fool of an enemy will stand to be piked in such a situation? The *hedge* would be the protection to the musqueteer, who would stand secure and shoot the pikeman; who is not upon an equality with the man carrying fire-arms, until he can rush upon him in close fight.

It has been the opinion of many distinguished soldiers that in *musquetry* there is more noise and smoke than execution; and that the real business is

done by the *bayonet*. If so, then possibly, for decisive actions, the superiority of the BRITANNIC SPEAR over the BAYONET may balance the disadvantage of wanting powder and ball. And if the spearman be armed also with a good pistol, as well as the short sword recommended in the "*Cursory Remarks*," it might add to his confidence.

If the engraver, without delaying this work, can copy the author's drawing of a *boarding pistol*, it will appear in the annexed plate. Either to the spearman in very close fight, or to our gallant seamen, who are perpetually shewing the *superiority of the SHORT cutlass*, when used with determined bravery, over the *bayonets* and *pikes*, with which our enemy's vessels are generally defended, it is imagined this pistol would be of singular use.

It has two short barrels, set in steel, which steel has a thin projecting edge, and is highly tempered, to save the barrels from the cut of a sabre. It has also a *guard* for the hand, and hangs at the left wrist, by a thong, in such a manner that the gripe of the stock must come into the hand, on merely hanging down the arm and bending the wrist; or by jerking the hand upwards, to throw the pistol into a right direction.

French sailors are armed with *crooked* sabres, the English with *straight* swords, called cutlasses: the former, of course, only *cut*, whereas the latter either

cut or *thrust*, as suits their purpose. If the English sailor have a *guard* to his boarding pistol, whenever his antagonist makes a stroke at the *left* side of his head, neck or body (and such strokes from a *right*-handed sailor using a sabre will be the most common) the English sailor may, at the same instant, defend himself with a pistol, and stab his adversary with his cutlass.

It is intended that his *fire* shall only be used on emergencies, when pressed upon by more than one assailant, or other critical case.

If one battalion, of those which, in p. 44 of the *Ægis* are denominated *column*, were in every weapon-take to compose a *reserve*, and were armed with Britannic Spears, boarding pistols, and short swords, it might be an essential improvement of the system which I have endeavoured, in that work, to explain.

Such a reserve being intended to be always at hand in time of battle, and to cover a retreat of the first assailants, whenever they were not successful in their onset, are supposed to be so near the enemy that firing, as a matter of importance, would be out of the question. In that case the arms now proposed would give brave men great advantage over the enemy, with his bayonets or his "long pikes."

As he who invents a new military weapon ought to teach the use of it *in the ranks*, the following

EXERCISE is offered to the consideration of military men. The writer contents himself with giving little more than the mere necessary positions; leaving it, for the most part, to the gentlemen of the *drill* to adjust the niceties of these positions; as well as to give precision, celerity, and neatness to the motions for changing from any one position to any other. It is not here intended even to give the best *succession* of positions for a parade practice.

THE POSITIONS, &c.

1. *The Ground.*

In this position, the spear lies on the *left* hand side of the spearman.

2. *The Order.*

The spear is planted on the *left* side of the spearman, the *bar* forwards; the spearman's *left* hand, at the arm's extent, rests against the *long gripe*; which, throughout the whole exercise, is never to be touched by the *right* hand.

3. *The Trail.*

The spear, by the left hand, is held off the ground, the *spear* pointing somewhat forwards.

4. *The Shoulder.*

In this position, the spear is on the *right side*, supported by the two middle fingers of the right hand within the short *opening*, the fore finger and thumb-end upon the *bar* in front, and the little finger upon the *gripe* behind; the arm at its full extent.

5. *The Elevate.*

The same as the last, except that the spear is now elevated as high as practicable with ease.

6. *The Charge.*

The same as with the firelock; but the *right* hand as far back upon the *short gripe* as possible, for advancing the spear; and the left hand, with the arm moderately extended, holding the *long gripe*.

N.B. For the remaining positions, it seems proper to give the words of command.

7. *Cross your guard.*

The spear being at the *Order*, is leaned a little forward, where it is met with the fingers of the right hand, applied opposite to the lower extremity

of the *guard*; the left hand being applied at the upper extremity; the thumb of the *right* hand is then placed upon the *sloping* part of the guard, and the other thumb upon the back of the guard; as soon as the thumbs have acted upon the *guard* until the extremities get clear, one of the *shaft* and the other of the *blade*, the fore finger of each hand is also applied, and the guard crossed. The spear and the hands then return to their positions, in the *order*.

8. *Receive the Horse.*

N. B. Whatever be the preceding position, (except in case of the *Ground*) the spearman is equally ready for this word of command; for, as it has already been said, that the *long gripe* is never to be touched by the *right* hand; so the *short gripe* is never to be touched by the *left* hand.

The front rank man comes down on the right knee, at the same time that he advances his left foot a full step, as in the firelock exercise, and forcibly strikes the acute angle of the *butt* of his spear into the ground, as far in front of him as he can without constraint; and resting his left elbow on the left thigh, points the spear for receiving the enemy; the centre and rear rank man comes to the *charge*; the

latter stepping enough to the right to avoid his file leader.

9. *Return your Guard.*

The spear being at the *Order*, is leaned a little forward, and at the same time sufficiently swivelled for the fingers of the right hand to be applied on the back of the guard on the same side. The head of the spear is then immediately grasped with the left hand, the thumb of that hand meeting the thumb of the other upon the moving end of the *spring*: the *spring* being thrust close to its *bed*, by the two thumbs, the fingers of the right hand force it into its vertical position; and the position of the *Order* is restored.

To the foregoing exercise, which is esteemed necessary, may be added two complimentary positions.

10. *Regard !*

The spearman, standing at the *Order*, now raises his left hand, and seizes the neck of the spear.

11. *Present your Arms !*


Needs no explanation.

A pattern Britannic Spear will be deposited with some mechanic, who will undertake to make them ; and a reference left with the publisher of this work.

THE END.

BOOKS

Printed by C. Mercier, 6, Northumberland-court, Strand.



The Britanick Spear

*and
Boarding Pistol*

*with a front view of the
Barrel and Ramrod
of the latter.*



Fig. II.

Scale $\frac{1}{2}$ of an inch to an




Fig. III.


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
England's Arms

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